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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
My dissertation investigates three separate issues pertaining to a country’s fi-
nancial development. The first essay provides an introduction to the three essays.
The second essay examines the combined effect of financial development and human
capital on economic growth. While both financial development and human capital
are individually positively correlated with growth, the literature has not emphasized
their combined effect on growth. In this essay, I analyze the extent to which the
effect of financial development on growth depends on a country’s level of human cap-
ital. Using dynamic panel difference and system GMM, as well as the pooled OLS, I
find that an increase in human capital decreases the impact of financial development
on growth and that countries that lack financial development can achieve greater
economic growth through an improvement in human capital.
The third essay analyzes how currency unions affect the financial development
of a country. This essay tests two forms of asymmetries on the effect of currency
unions on financial development; I analyze if currency unions have an equal effect
on various forms of financial development, and whether high-income and low-income
countries are impacted differently. I find some evidence in favor of both forms of
asymmetries with pooled OLS and fixed effect estimation using data on 152 countries
and territories over the 1970-2006 time period.
The fourth essay tests how financial development affects firms’ export market
participations and the volume of exports utilizing a firm-level data set which incor-
porates about 43,500 firms from 80 countries for the time period 2002-2009. Using an
instrumental variable approach, I find that a country’s financial development nega-
tively affects the extensive margin of trade and positively affects the intensive margin
of trade. Furthermore, this study finds that financial development has a dispropor-
tionate positive affect on firms with a higher level of external dependence for both
margins of trade. Finally, I find that financial development exerts an asymmetric ef-
fect on young and mature firms in their export participations but not on the volume
of exports.
KEYWORDS: Financial development; Economic growth; Currency unions; Exten-
sive and intensive margins of trade.
Biniv K. Maskay
Author’s signature
July 30, 2012
Date
THREE ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT
By
Biniv K. Maskay
Dr. Jenny Minier
Director of Dissertation
Dr. Aaron Yelowitz
Director of Graduate Studies
July 30, 2012
Date
For my grandparents, Keshar Bahadur Maskay and Bishnu Devi Maskay, my
parents, Bishwa Keshar Maskay and Noor Maskay, my sister, Aniva Shrestha, my
brother, Aniv Keshar Maskay, and all my loved ones.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It gives me a great pleasure to thank everyone who helped me write a successful
dissertation. I owe my deepest gratitude to my dissertation advisor, Jenny
Minier, whose insight, encouragement, guidance and support throughout the
stages of the dissertation enabled me to complete this work. I would like to thank
my dissertation committee, J. S. Butler, Yoonbai Kim and Nicolai Petrovsky for
their invaluable feedback on my dissertation. I also would like to thank Leslie
Vincent for her time serving as an outside examiner. Last but not least, I would
like to thank my family and friends for their love and support. This dissertation
would not have been complete without their kindness.
iii
Contents
Acknowledgements iii
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
1 Introduction to Dissertation 1
2 Financial Development, Human Capital and Economic Growth 6
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 A brief model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 Indicators of financial development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.2 Measures of Human Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.3 Control variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.4 Quantile Regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Methodologies and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.1 Pooled OLS (POLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.2 GMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4.2.1 GMM estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.2.2 Instrument proliferation and missing observations . . . . . 25
2.4.3 GMM results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
.1 Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
.1.1 List of countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
.1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
.1.3 Description and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
.1.4 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
.1.5 Robustness Check (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
.1.6 Robustness Check (II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
.1.7 Robustness Check (III) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3 Analyzing the Effect of Currency Unions on Financial Development 38
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 Background on currency unions, international financial integration, and fi-
nancial development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.1 How does forming (or joining) a currency union affect financial devel-
opment of a country? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
iv
3.3 Methodology and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.1 Estimating equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
.1 Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
.1.1 List of countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
.1.2 Description and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
.1.3 Pairwise Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
.1.4 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4 Financial Development, External Dependence and the Margins of Trade:
A Firm-level Analysis 67
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Background Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4 Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4.1 The extensive margin of trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4.2 The intensive margin of trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5.1 The extensive margin of trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5.2 The intensive margin of trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
.1 Appendix C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
.1.1 Description and Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
.1.2 Country level data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
.1.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
.1.4 Industry Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
.1.5 Pairwise correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
References 101
Vita 106
v
List of Figures
2.1 Quantile Regression (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Quantile Regression (II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Marginal Effect of Financial Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Pooled OLS results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 System GMM results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 Predicted growth rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
5 Pairwise Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6 POLS Results with privy and value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7 Difference GMM Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8 System GMM Results with privy and value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Currency Unions and Liquid Liabilities (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Fixed Effects: Currency Unions and Liquid Liabilities (II) . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 Currency Unions and Stock Market Liquidity (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 Fixed Effects: Currency Unions and Stock Market Liquidity (II) . . . . . . 56
6 Pairwise Correlation for all countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7 Pairwise Correlation for Countries in Currency Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
8 Pairwise Correlation for Countries not in Currency Unions . . . . . . . . . . 62
9 Currency Unions and Stock Market Capitalization (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
10 Currency Unions and Private Credit (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
11 Currency Unions and Liquid Liabilities (III): Without anchor countries . . . 65
12 Currency Unions and Liquid Liabilities (IV): Without EMU countries . . . 66
4.1 Financial development and Extensive margin of trade using overall industry-
level measure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2 Financial development and Extensive margin of trade using age-based measure 86
4.3 Financial development and Intensive margin of trade of all firms . . . . . . 89
4.4 Financial development and Intensive margin of trade of Mature and Young
firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5 Country level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6 All Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7 Exporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
8 Non-exporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
9 RZ numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
10 Pairwise Correlation with Property Rights Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
vii
1
Introduction to Dissertation
This dissertation consists of three essays on financial development. Financial develop-
ment is defined as an improvement in the quality, quantity, or efficiency of the financial
systems that are comprised of financial markets, banks and other financial intermediaries.
The progresses of financial systems are believed to reduce information and transaction costs,
and improve the allocation of resources. In the second essay, I examine the combined ef-
fect of financial development and human capital on economic growth. In the third essay, I
analyze how currency unions affect the financial development of a country. Finally, in the
fourth essay, I investigate how financial development affects the export market participa-
tion and the volume of exports. I find that for low-income countries, currency unions bring
about increases in the size of the formal intermediary sector which expands the availability
of credit. This, in turn, is most positively associated with economic growth where a coun-
try’s education level is low. Countries perhaps attain this economic growth through higher
export volumes among firms that are already exporting.
The second essay of my dissertation is titled “Financial Development, Human Capital,
and Economic Growth.” In this essay, I examine the extent to which the effect of finan-
cial development on growth depends on a country’s level of human capital. Many studies
have demonstrated the importance of financial development and human capital in economic
growth. While both financial development and human capital are individually positively
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correlated with growth, the literature has not emphasized their combined effect on growth.
The role of financial development in mobilizing savings, providing for the evaluation of
projects, and managing risk is well established. These functions allow for increased tech-
nological innovation as firms can finance longer-term, high-risk projects. However, this
increased innovation also depends on a supply of researchers or entrepreneurs which varies
widely across countries. Given the variations in human capital across countries, I analyze if
the effect of financial development differs for countries with different levels of human capital.
I use a neo-classical Cobb-Douglas production function to motivate my estimating equa-
tion. The main variables that I use as proxies of financial development are called liquid
liabilities and market capitalization. Liquid liabilities captures the financial depth of a coun-
try, defined as the size of the formal financial intermediary sector relative to the GDP of a
country. Market capitalization captures the size of the stock market relative to economic
activity. I use the percentage of people above 25 years of age who have successfully com-
pleted secondary education as a proxy for the number of researchers. The data comprises of
89 countries for the years from 1960-2009, which are averaged to five year panels. I estimate
a reduced form growth equation with the economic growth rate as the dependent variable,
and financial development variables, human capital and a host of other control variables as
the independent variables.
I use system GMM as my main estimator as this estimation method can potentially
account for various problems that afflict growth studies such as omitted variable bias, endo-
geneity, and temporary measurement errors. Using the system GMM estimator, I find that
increases in human capital decrease the effect of financial development on growth. This pa-
per also shows that countries that lack financial development can achieve greater economic
growth through improvement in human capital. The robustness of the results is checked
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through the use of alternate measures of financial development, namely private credit and
market value, which measure credit allocated to the private sector by money deposit banks,
and stock market liquidity, respectively. The results are also robust to difference GMM,
one-step system GMM, and pooled OLS.
In the third essay, titled “Analyzing the Effect of Currency Unions on Financial De-
velopment,” I look at how currency unions affect the financial development of a country.
Currency unions are thought to have a positive impact on international financial integration
(ifi) but the effect of ifi on an economy is inconclusive. Given the controversies surrounding
the effect of ifi on growth, this essay empirically tests if forming or joining a currency union
affects financial development. As the finance-growth literature finds a positive correlation
between financial development and economic growth, analyzing this relationship between
currency unions and financial development allows me to explore a channel through which
currency unions may affect an economy, in addition to through an increase in trade and
price co-movement among the member nations.
In addition to testing the direct effect of currency unions on financial development, this
essay checks for two types of asymmetries in estimating the impact of currency unions on
financial development. First, given that financial development literature utilizes several
measures of financial development to capture various services provided by the financial
systems, I test if currency unions impact these measures differently. Second, using median
level of income as a threshold value, this paper estimates if currency unions affect financial
development of high-income and low-income countries equally.
Using data on 152 countries and territories over the 1970-2006 time period, I find some
evidence in favor of both forms of asymmetries. Using pooled OLS, the results show that
currency unions negatively affect the size of the overall financial systems but positively affect
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the liquidity of stock markets. Furthermore, using fixed effects estimation, this paper finds
a strong asymmetric effect of currency unions on financial development of high-income and
low-income countries. Although the coefficient estimate on the effect of currency unions on
liquid liabilities is statistically insignificant on the full sample, I find the effect on liquid lia-
bilities to be negative and significant for high-income countries, and positive and significant
for low-income countries. In contrast, the results indicate a negative relationship between
currency unions and stock market liquidity for low income countries.
In the fourth essay, titled “Financial Development, External Dependence and the Mar-
gins of Trade: A Firm-level Analysis,” I examine how financial development affects firms’
export market participations (the extensive margin of trade) and the volume of exports
(the intensive margin of trade) given the industry specific common measure of the firms’
dependence on external finance. Furthermore, exploiting Rajan and Zingale’s (1998) mea-
sure of external dependence for young and mature firms in an industry, I test if financial
development affects the extensive and intensive margins of trade of these firms differently.
I use private credit as a measure of financial development, which is defined as the credit
to the private sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP. Because of the poten-
tial endogeneity concerns in the export regression, this paper uses an instrumental variable
approach to account for the problem. Property rights index is used to instrument the en-
dogenous measure of financial development. The validity of the instruments are tested in
various ways.
Using firm-level data of approximately 43,500 firms from 80 countries for the 2002-2009
time period, I find that while dependence on external finance of firms negatively affects both
the export market participation and the volume of exports, a country’s financial develop-
ment negatively affects the extensive margin of trade and positively affects the intensive
4
margin of trade. Furthermore, this study finds that financial development disproportion-
ately promotes the export activities of firms with higher levels of external dependence.
Finally, I find that young and mature firms are affected differently by financial development
on their export participations. However, the results do not support such asymmetric effect
for the volume of exports. These findings contend that examining the effect of financial
development using the overall industry-level measure of external dependence may mask an
important asymmetric effect of a country’s financial development on young and mature
firms.
5
2
Financial Development, Human Capital and Economic Growth
titletopskip
2.1 Introduction
Many studies have highlighted the importance of financial development and human capi-
tal on economic growth. While both financial development and human capital are positively
correlated with growth, their combined effect has not been emphasized in the literature.
The role of financial development in mobilizing savings, providing for the evaluation of
projects, and managing risk is well established (Levine, 1997, 2005). These functions allow
for increased technological innovation, as firms can finance longer-term, high-risk projects.
However, this increased innovation depends on a supply of researchers or entrepreneurs
that tends to vary widely across countries. For example, in 2007, South Korea had 4,627
researchers in research and development (R&D) per million people, while Mexico had 353.
The OECD countries had an average of 3,012 researchers per million people, whereas Latin
American and Caribbean countries had 487 (World Development Indicators, 2009). Does
financial development affect the economic growth process of these countries equally? To
what extent does the effect of financial development on growth depend on a country’s level
of human capital?
Financial development is defined as an improvement in the quality, quantity, or effi-
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ciency of the financial systems that are comprised of financial markets, banks and other
financial intermediaries. Advances in the services provided by the financial system are be-
lieved to reduce information and transaction costs, which allow for increased innovation and
productivity of a country.
A significant amount of work has been done regarding financial development of a country
given the theoretical appeal of the roles of financial systems. Numerous studies have looked
at exogenous factors that contribute to financial development such as geography (Levine
et al., 2000), technology (Merton, 1995), legal systems (LaPorta et al., 1998), and fiscal
policies (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). Many studies have analyzed the effect of financial
development on economic growth and variables conducive to growth such as total factor
productivity, efficiency, private savings, investments, capital accumulation, and productivity
growth.1 Apart from a few notable exceptions (e.g., Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988), the
general consensus in the empirical literature is that there exists a positive relationship
between financial development and economic growth.
These findings are robust to various econometric specifications. King and Levine (1993),
and Levine and Zervos (1998) use OLS estimation in their study. Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn
(2005), and Luitel and Khan (1999), among others, use time series data to analyze the ef-
fect of financial development and find that financial development affects economic growth
through factor accumulation. The use of panel data fixed effects (e.g., Beck and Levine,
2004; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000) and dynamic panel GMM estimation (e.g., Levine et al.,
2000; Rioja and Valev, 2004) are also fairly common in the literature. While many studies
use cross-country data, Rajan and Zingales (1998a) carry out an industry level examina-
tion and find that industries that rely more on external finance for capital expenditures,
1For example, see King and Levine (1993); Levine and Zervos (1998); Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005);
Atje and Jovanovic (1993); Benhabib and Spiegel (1997).
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measured as a ratio of the difference between capital expenditures and cash flow to capital
expenditures, benefit more from financial development.
Even though a large number of empirical studies have analyzed this issue, the channel
through which financial development affects growth is still unclear. Levine (1997) points out
that the proximate causes of growth that financial systems affect are capital accumulation
and total factor productivity. Total factor productivity is found to have a larger effect
on growth among the two variables as shown in the influential studies by Solow (1957),
Mankiw et al. (1992), Hall and Jones (1999), and Aghion et al. (2005).1 An important link
that the finance literature has not emphasized is the role of human capital in achieving
higher levels of innovation or technological progress. Human capital is one of the variables
that is consistently found to have a positive effect on growth. Barro (1991) and Mankiw
et al. (1992), among others, find a substantial effect of human capital on growth. Levine and
Renelt (1992) find human capital as one of the few variables that passes the rigid robustness
tests in their famous extreme-bounds analysis.
One channel through which financial development may affect growth is through an in-
teraction with human capital. The finance-growth literature emphasizes the fact that some
investment is needed at first for innovation to take place. This comes with pooling of
resources from households, a service that financial systems provide. New technology is pro-
duced and innovation is achieved once there is adequate investment. However, having a
high level of financial development may not be enough to achieve innovation. An economy
needs researchers with high levels of human capital to facilitate innovation and technolog-
ical progress. Similarly, a certain level of human capital is required for an economy to
adopt technologies of another country or close the gap with the technological leader. This
1Some studies, such as Howitt and Aghion (1998), however, argue that there is a complementary relationship
between capital accumulation and innovation.
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role of human capital suggests a complementarity between human capital and financial
development as both factors seem to be relevant in the growth process.
This line of reasoning leads one to believe that a country with a high level of human
capital would benefit more from financial development by mobilizing the resources to their
best use. An increase in financial development would allow the scientists and engineers
of a country to take advantage of the pooling of resources that are needed for research
and development, and for innovation purposes. Along the same line, it can be argued that
a country with a low level of human capital would not be able to make the best use of
financial development. A country with a low number (or sub-par quality) of researchers
may not be able to innovate and increase productivity as much, even when the country
experiences advancement in financial development. This hypothesis postulates that the
impact of financial development on growth increases as the human capital of a country
increases.
A competing hypothesis is advanced by Kendall (2009) on the combined effect of human
capital and financial development on growth. Using disaggregated data at the sub-national
level in India, he empirically tests how the effect of financial development, measured by
banking sector development, on growth differs in districts with different levels of human
capital (measured by literacy rate). He finds that the growth of net domestic product
in many districts is inhibited by a lack of financial development. However, some of the
hindrances are negated in districts with human capital above the median level, where growth
is achieved through development of the less finance-intensive service sector. His results are
in contrast to conventional wisdom on the relationship between human capital and financial
development in affecting growth, suggesting that financial development and human capital
are substitutes in the growth process.
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Although Kendall (2009) also examines the combined effect of financial development and
human capital on economic growth, my study differs from his in several ways. First, while his
paper focuses on sub-national data from India, I use cross-country data to analyze a larger
sample of countries. Using such a dataset allows me to see whether the relationship between
the combined effect of human capital and financial development and growth holds across
countries, in addition to what Kendall (2009) finds for one particular country. Second, while
Kendall (2009) uses one measure of financial development, proxied by the size of the banking
sector, I use several measures of financial development to capture varied services provided
by the financial systems. The inclusion of stock market variables in addition to banking
variables is particularly pertinent given the voluminous literature on the relative importance
of banks and stock markets in affecting growth.1 Third, Kendall (2009) uses a dummy
variable to identify districts with high levels of human capital based on median literacy rates
to see how financial development affects those districts. I look at the entire distribution
of human capital across countries and test how the effect of financial development changes
with the changing level of human capital. Finally, I use a number of econometric techniques
such as pooled OLS (POLS), and dynamic panel difference and system GMM estimators
to analyze the combined effect of financial development and human capital on growth. In
doing so, I find that increase in human capital decreases the effect of financial development
on growth. The result is robust to all estimation methods and all measures of financial
development, suggesting that countries that lack financial development can achieve greater
economic growth through improvements in human capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief model.
Section 4.3 discusses the measures of financial development, human capital, and several
1For example Rajan and Zingales (1998b), Boot and Thakor (1997) and Levine (2002).
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control variables and presents a preliminary analysis of the data using the quantile regres-
sion. Section 4.4 outlines the methodologies and their corresponding results. Section 4.6
concludes the paper along with suggestions for further studies.
2.2 A brief model
Consider the following traditional Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yit = AitL
β
itK
γ
it (2.1)
where i and t index country and time respectively. Y , L, and K represent real per capita
GDP, labor, and capital respectively. Total factor productivity (TFP), A, is a complement
to other factors of production, and is expressed in the following form:
Ait = Ai,1F
φ
i,tH
ψ
i,t(F ×H)
δ
i,te
(λt+uit) (2.2)
where F and H denote financial development and human capital respectively. Here, TFP
is a function of financial development, human capital, and the interaction of the two. Ai,1
represents the initial level of technology, λt captures the time trend in innovation and
technological progress, and u is a stochastic composite error term.1 Hence, from equations
(2.1) and (2.2), we have,
Yit = Ai,1L
β
itK
γ
itF
φ
i,tH
ψ
i,t(F ×H)
δ
i,te
(λt+uit) (2.3)
Accounting for the “convergence” effect as per the Solow-Swan model (Solow, 1956; Swan,
1956), and other variables as deemed important by various growth studies, equation (2.3)
1uit=γi + vit, where γi is the time-invariant country-fixed effects.
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is converted to the following estimable reduced form growth equation:
∆yit = D + λt + (α− 1)yi,t−1 + βlLi,t + βkKi,t
+βfFi,t + βhHi,t + βfh(F ×H)i,t + βcCit + uit (2.4)
α < 1 for i = 1,.....,N and t = 2,.....,T
where yit is the log of real GDP per capita, D is a constant, and C is a vector of control vari-
ables discussed in the following section. βf shows the direct effect of financial development
on economic growth, and βfh shows the combined effect of human capital and financial de-
velopment. Given the competing hypotheses on how the interaction variable affects growth
(as discussed in Section 2.1), the sign of βfh would allow me to see which effect offsets
the other. A positive sign on βfh would suggest that financial development and human
capital are net complements, while a negative sign on βfh would imply that the variables
are net substitutes in the growth process. Finally, equation (2.4) allows me to compute the
marginal effect of financial development on growth, which depends on the level of human
capital. Evaluating this effect at various points on the distribution of human capital across
countries allows me to see how the total marginal effect of financial development changes
with the level of human capital.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Indicators of financial development
I use four variables as the indicators of financial development, of which two are the
main variables and the other two are used to test the robustness of the results. The first
measure captures “financial depth,” defined as the size of the formal financial intermediary
sector relative to the GDP of a country. King and Levine (1993) use this variable in a
seminal study in the empirical finance and growth literature, who argue that the size of
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financial systems is positively related to the services they provide. M3 is used to measure
the size of the financial sector which consists of demand and interest bearing assets of
financial intermediaries and currency held outside the country. I refer to this variable as
liquid liabilities (lly) and it is computed as a ratio of M3 to GDP.
The second measure I use as an indicator of financial development is the size of the stock
market relative to economic activity. This measure is computed as a ratio of value of listed
domestic shares (capitalization) on domestic exchanges divided by GDP, and is referred to
as market capitalization (cap). This variable is used in many other studies as a measure
of financial development, including by Levine and Zervos (1998), who point out that large
stock markets are not necessarily efficient, but can provide additional services that small
markets cannot.
I use two additional measures of financial development to evaluate the robustness of the
results. They are referred to as private credit (privy) and market value (value). Private
credit estimates credit allocated to the private sector by the deposit money banks as a
proportion of GDP. A high value of private credit indicates a deep credit market as it shows
that private sector has more access to credit from banks as a percentage of GDP. A high
value of privy potentially encourages economic growth as banks exercise their functions of
risk-pooling, evaluating managers, acquiring information and selecting projects when the
credit is extended to the private sector.
Market valuation (value) captures stock market liquidity which is computed as the
value of the trades of domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. High market
value indicates higher efficiency and lower transaction costs, that may not be captured by
the size of a stock market.
The data for all of the financial development variables are obtained from Beck, Demirguc-
13
Kunt, and Levine (2009). Table 4 in Appendix .1.2 reports pairwise correlations between
the measure of financial development.
2.3.2 Measures of Human Capital
Data on the number of researchers and developers across countries over time would be
ideal for the purposes of this study. These data would show the number of researchers and
developers that are working towards adoption and creation of knowledge and technology in
a given economy. Given the level of financial development in these countries, one could use
the data on researchers and developers to see if financial development and human capital
are substitutes or complements in achieving growth. However, only a short time series of
such data are available for a limited number of countries. As a result, I resort to using
education data.
Various measures of education have been used in the literature to estimate human capi-
tal. They can be broadly categorized into stock and flow measures (levels vs first differences)
of human capital. Lucas (1988) argues that economic growth depends on the rate of accu-
mulation of human capital and hence falls under the flow concept. Mankiw et al. (1992)
choose the flow measure of human capital as well by using primary and secondary school
enrollment rates.
Even though there is, conceivably, a high correlation between a flow and a stock measure
of human capital, Nelson and Phelps (1966) argue that the stock of human capital is a better
measure as it determines a country’s ability to innovate and catch up to more advanced
countries with creation and diffusion of knowledge. A widely used stock measure of human
capital is average years of schooling. However, this measure is not without flaws. Mulligan
and Sala-i Martin (2000) refute the use of the variable on the following grounds: first,
workers of two different educational backgrounds are considered perfect substitutes for each
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other. Second, the marginal effect of one year of schooling is typically assumed to be
constant, and productivity differentials among workers with different levels of education are
proportional to their years of schooling. Finally, the elasticity of substitution across workers
of different groups is assumed to be constant across countries and over time. Barro and Lee
(2000) also mention the drawbacks of the variable; the measure only accounts for the level
of education and does not consider skills or training acquired after formal schooling or at
work, and it does not account for differences in school quality within and across countries.
Aghion and Howitt (1998), however, discuss an important advantage of using a stock
measure of human capital. They argue that the measure that separates the percentage of
people having different levels of education serves as a proxy for researchers and developers.
In particular, they argue that using information on secondary and higher education better
reflects the number of potential researchers and developers in an economy. Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994) use stock measures of human capital as well as flow measures. They use
the percentage of people who have successfully completed primary, secondary and tertiary
levels as stock measures. The authors find that these measures of human capital positively
and statistically significantly affect growth, whereas flow measures of human capital do not.
In conjunction with the literature, the stock measure of human capital is the most
relevant for this paper, as the variable proxies for the number of researchers and developers
in an economy. I use the percentage of people, above 25 years of age, who have successfully
completed secondary education as a proxy for the number of researchers, and I call this
measure hc. The pairwise correlation between hc and number of researchers in R&D per
million for years 2001-2005 is 0.53. The data for hc are obtained through Barro and Lee
(2010).
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2.3.3 Control variables
Various control variables are used in a typical empirical growth study. Levine, Loayza,
and Beck (2000) group these variables into three categories. The basic conditioning infor-
mation set includes a constant term, the logarithm of initial per capita GDP and initial
educational attainment. The policy conditioning information set includes inflation, mea-
sures of government size, population growth and trade openness, and the variables in the
basic conditioning information set. The full conditioning information set includes measures
of political stability, ethnic diversity, and the variables in the policy conditioning set.
In this study, I restrict my control variables to the policy conditioning information
set due to the instrument proliferation problem that arises as the number of independent
variables increases. The problem of instrument proliferation, which is especially a cause of
concern in GMM estimation, is discussed further in Section 2.4.2.2. For POLS, I use initial
income at the beginning of each period, which is referred to as Initial. For GMM estimation,
however, instead of using measures of initial income and education attainment, I use lagged
values of measures of income and education attainment as instruments for contemporaneous
ones.
The data set covers 89 countries in 5-year panels from 1960-2009. The list of countries
is reported in Appendix .1.1. Appendix .1.2 presents data descriptions and sources of these
variables, along with summary statistics which are presented in Table 4.
2.3.4 Quantile Regression
I use quantile regression for a preliminary analysis of the data. Quantile regression
provides parameter estimates at different quantiles of the conditional distribution, which
allows me to see if there is a heterogeneous relationship between the dependent and the
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independent variables. In the context of this paper, quantile regression allows me to analyze
how financial development and the interaction variable of financial development and human
capital affect the countries that vary in growth rates. Such analysis would indicate how
important each variable is to a fast growing economy.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict the quantile regression results. The thick slanted lines show
the marginal effect of the independent variables on the growth rate based on various quan-
tiles of the conditional distribution. The shaded areas show the 95% confidence bands,
generated with the bootstrapped standard errors. The OLS estimates are shown by the
middle horizontal line.
Figure 2.1a shows the marginal effect of lly on growth based on various quantiles of
the conditional distribution of growth rates. Similarly, Figure 2.1b shows the marginal
effect of cap on growth at different quantiles. Both figures show that the effect of financial
development is higher for countries with high growth rates.
Figure 2.2 displays the marginal effect of the interaction of human capital and financial
development on economic growth at various quantiles of the conditional distribution. For
the interaction of lly and hc, as shown in Figure 2.2a, the effect of the interaction variable
on growth increases with the growth rate at the lower tail of the distribution (up to about
the 25th percentile). However, for countries that have higher growth rates, the effect on
growth is lower. Figure 2.2b shows the effect of interaction of cap and hc. The effect is
fairly constant up to about the 75th percentile of the conditional distribution, and is lower
for countries with higher growth rates.
The cursory analyses based on quantile regression implies that the effect of financial
development is higher for countries with high growth rates. However, the effect of financial
development on growth also depends on the level of human capital, and the marginal effect of
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: Quantile Regression (I)
(a) (b)
Figure 2.2: Quantile Regression (II)
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the interaction variable on growth is lower for countries with high growth rates. This result
suggests that the high value on the interaction variable is not as important for countries
with high growth rates.
2.4 Methodologies and Results
2.4.1 Pooled OLS (POLS)
For an initial look at the data, the results of POLS are presented in Panel A of Table
2.1. The POLS results can be viewed as the contemporaneous association between the de-
pendent variable and regressors as I examine the variables that are averaged over the same
period.1 Here, the coefficients on human capital are positive and statistically significant for
all but one specification. These results show that human capital has a positive effect on
growth, as shown by numerous studies including Barro (1991) and Mankiw et al. (1992).
The omitted variable bias in specifications (1) and (3) causes the coefficient on lly to be
biased downwards, which causes the coefficients to be negative. Here, the omitted variable
is the interaction of lly and hc. The results also show that the estimates of the interaction
variables are negative for all specifications and statistically significant when the interaction
variables are considered one at a time. The negative signs on the interaction variables in-
dicate that the effect of financial development on growth decreases with an increasing level
of human capital. These results are similar to what Kendall (2009) finds for sub-national
regions in India.
To estimate the precise nature of the relationship between the variables, I evaluate the
magnitude of marginal effects of financial development and their respective standard errors
by examining the interaction term at various points of the distribution of human capital
1King and Levine (1993) define the contemporaneous relationship synonymously.
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Table 2.1: Pooled OLS results
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:
LLY -0.0109*** 0.0043 -0.0099*** -0.0002
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010)
CAP 0.0034 0.0038 0.0131** 0.0097
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
HC 0.0113 0.0477* 0.0312* 0.0480*
(0.012) (0.025) (0.017) (0.025)
HC LLY -0.0006** -0.0004
(0.000) (0.000)
HC CAP -0.0004** -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000)
Initial GDP -0.7719*** -0.7769*** -0.7947*** -0.7894***
(0.156) (0.153) (0.155) (0.154)
Pop. Growth -0.7822*** -0.7268*** -0.7421*** -0.7202***
(0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142)
Govt. Share -0.0060 0.0002 -0.0080 -0.0031
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
Inflation 0.0368*** 0.0346*** 0.0350*** 0.0342***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Open 0.0085*** 0.0070*** 0.0070*** 0.0066***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 5.9014*** 5.3147*** 5.9039*** 5.5111***
(1.534) (1.474) (1.527) (1.507)
Panel B: Implied marginal effect of financial development
at Q25 of hc -0.0016 0.0093***
(0.006) (0.004)
at Q50 of hc -0.0064 0.0062*
(0.004) (0.004)
at Q75 of hc -0.0129*** 0.0020
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 372 372 372 372
R-squared 0.246 0.254 0.254 0.256
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All variables are in percentages
Distribution of hc: at Q25=9.56 ; at Q50=17.44; at Q75=28.14
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across countries. These results are shown in Panel B of Table 2.1.1 The results indicate an
economically large effect of the interaction variable on growth. As an illustrative example,
as shown in column (3), the coefficient on the marginal effect of cap on 5-year average
growth of a country with hc at the 25th percentile value is 0.0093, and 0.0062 at the 50th
percentile value. This finding implies that for a 10% decrease in cap, the country with the
25th percentile hc grows more slowly by 3.1% than the country with the 50th percentile hc.
This result shows that lack of financial development hurts countries with low human capital
more than countries with high human capital.
Furthermore, the results show that for a country with the 25th percentile hc, an economy
grows by 13% more when financial development of the country increases from the 25th
percentile to the 50th percentile.2 However, for a country with the 50th percentile hc, an
increase in the growth rate achieved from an equal change in financial development is only
8.96%.3 The results show that improvement in financial development helps countries with
low levels of human capital more than those with high levels.
Appendix .1.5 presents the POLS results of two additional measures of financial devel-
opment, privy and value, that are used as robustness checks. These results also indicate
that the effect of financial development decreases with increasing levels of human capital.
2.4.2 GMM
In this section, I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators developed
for dynamic panels by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991),
Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). There are several advantages
of using GMM estimators over simple cross-section regression and other panel data models
1The partial F-tests reject the null hypotheses that the marginal effects of financial development are the same
at three different levels of human capital as presented in the table.
2From column (3), ∆ growth rate = .0093 ×∆ cap
3From column (3), ∆ growth rate = .0062 ×∆ cap
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(such as fixed effects). As outlined in Bond et al. (2001), GMM estimators account for var-
ious problems that afflict growth studies such as (1) omitted variable bias, (2) endogeneity,
and (3) temporary measurement errors. First, time-invariant country fixed characteristics
such as geography may be correlated with explanatory variables and will be a part of the
error term if omitted. Omission of such variables can lead to biased estimates. Through
first differencing, the estimates obtained with GMM estimators can be free of such a bias.
Second, GMM estimators use lagged variables as instruments in the presence of endogenous
independent variables. Using such instruments extracts the exogenous component of the
independent variables which allows for consistent estimation of the parameters. Finally, as
argued by Bond et al. (2001), the estimation of parameters is potentially consistent through
the use of lagged levels of independent variables for variables in differences as instruments
in the presence of temporary measurement errors.
The level of financial development is endogenous in the model described in Section
2.2. Several time series studies have tested the direction of causality between finance and
growth. Although many of them find that financial development granger causes economic
growth, several studies have failed to rule out that causality runs from growth to financial
development.1 Various studies, such as Levine and Zervos (1998), have resorted to using
the initial value of financial development because of the possibility of simultaneity between
financial development and growth. Using initial values as proxies for current values results
in information and efficiency loss, even though the technique addresses some of the simul-
taneity problem associated with estimation. Beck and Levine (2004) comment that “using
proper instruments for the contemporaneous values of the explanatory variables is there-
fore preferable to using initial values.” The GMM estimators, as mentioned above, correct
1For example, Calderon and Liu (2003), and Ang and McKibbin (2007).
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this problem of endogeneity by using lagged realizations of explanatory variables that are
exogenous to the dependent variable.
As in the case with financial development, human capital is endogenous in the model.
The effect of human capital on growth rates is well documented and the literature gen-
erally finds a positive correlation between the variables.1 However, there is some support
in the literature for a bi-direction causality between human capital and growth. For ex-
ample, based on time series analysis from Greece, Asteriou and Agiomirgianakis (2001)
show that economic growth and the level of education affect each other. As discussed in
the previous paragraph, using initial levels of human capital in growth regressions because
of bi-directional causality between the variables results in information and efficiency loss.
Hence, I adopt a GMM estimator to utilize internal instruments through the use of lagged
realizations of the explanatory variables to account for endogeneity.
The rest of my analysis focuses on GMM estimators because of the aforementioned
advantages that GMM estimators have over POLS and other panel data models. The GMM
estimation procedure and some issues with the estimation are discussed in the following
subsections. The GMM results immediately follow.
2.4.2.1 GMM estimation
The dynamic panel GMM regressions are available in two forms: the difference and the
system GMM estimators. The difference GMM instruments the right-hand-side variables
in differences using levels of lagged dependent variables. The system GMM utilizes both
lagged differences and levels of regressors as instruments to estimate the equation. In this
paper, I use the system GMM estimator because of several advantages it has over the
difference GMM estimator. Blundell and Bond (1998), and Bond et al. (2001) show that
1For example, Barro (1991), Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009).
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the difference GMM estimator is subject to downward bias given a small number of time
periods in the data. These authors argue that the lagged levels of explanatory variables
are only weakly exogenous when the variable shows persistence and the bias is aggravated
by differencing weakly exogenous dependent variables observed for a small number of time
periods. The system GMM, on the other hand, exploits the assumption that the first
differences of the endogenous variables are uncorrelated with the initial condition, which
allows for additional moment conditions to be used in coefficient estimation. Bond et al.
(2001) show that system GMM has superior finite sample properties with less bias and more
precision when the variables show more persistence.
Two tests are necessary to ensure consistency of GMM estimates as suggested by Arel-
lano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The Sargan and Hansen tests of
over-identifying restrictions examine the overall validity of instruments. The Sargan test is
not sensitive to the number of instruments used but is not robust to heteroskedasticity or
serial correlation, whereas the Hansen test is sensitive to the number of instruments but is
robust. These test of overidentifying restrictions tests the null hypothesis that instruments
are exogenous. In this study, preference is given to the Hansen test because system GMM
is particularly sensitive to instrument proliferation and the Hansen test can detect such
a problem. For an instrument to be valid, we want a high p-value (to fail to reject the
null hypothesis that variables are exogenous), but not “too high” which would indicate a
weakened Hansen test as a result of instrument proliferation.
The second test inspects autocorrelation in the error term vit. Here I test whether the
error term vit is second-order serially correlated in differences. For the instruments to be
valid, the null of no serial correlation in the second order cannot be rejected (the error terms
are, however, first-order serially correlated in differences by construction). Additionally,
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since system GMM uses additional moment conditions to difference GMM, the difference-
in-Hansen test is employed to test if those moment conditions are valid. The validity of
these additional moment conditions would provide support for the use of the system GMM
estimator.
2.4.2.2 Instrument proliferation and missing observations
Instrument proliferation is a serious problem in GMM estimation, especially in system
GMM. If there are three time periods, first difference GMM uses one instrument whereas
system GMM uses two, both in level and differences. As the number of time periods
increases the instruments used in a model increases rapidly which may cause some problems.
Roodman (2007) argues that a large collection of instruments might be individually valid
but can collectively overfit endogenous variables and hence can be invalid in finite samples.
He also points out that the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions is weakened as a
result of instrument proliferation and is particularly problematic for system GMM.
I use two strategies to account for the instrument proliferation problem. First, I use only
a limited number of independent variables in the growth regression. I restrict the estimating
equation to only two financial development variables that measure different services provided
by the financial systems. I also restrict the control variables to the policy conditioning
information set as discussed in Section (4.3). Second, I “collapse” instruments to somewhat
suppress instrument proliferation. The dimension of an un-collapsed matrix of instruments
is quadratic in the number of time periods (T) as each instrument generates a new column for
itself and its lagged realizations. Collapsing of the instrument matrix reduces the instrument
count by lessening the number of columns in the instrument matrix.
A problem this paper shares with many cross country growth studies is that of missing
values. This problem is magnified when taking the first-difference transformation because
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if zt−1 is missing, for example, then the transformation creates missing values for both ∆zt
and ∆zt−1. To address this problem, I use “forward orthogonal deviation” transformation
as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995).1 This transformation subtracts the average of
all future observations that are available for a variable, which minimizes data loss.
2.4.3 GMM results
Table 2.2 presents the results of two-step system GMM using Windmeijer correction.2,3
The results show that the coefficient estimates on human capital (hc) and market capitaliza-
tion (cap) are positive and statistically significant across all specifications. The coefficients
on liquid liabilities (lly) are negative in specifications (1) and (3). As in the results of
POLS, the negatives estimates on lly could be driven by the omitted variable bias, where
the interaction of lly and hc is omitted in those specifications. The results also show
that the estimates of the interaction of lly and hc are negative and statistically significant
for all specifications. The interaction of cap and hc is negative in all specifications as
well, but statistically significant only when it is the only interaction variable considered.
These findings are consistent with the POLS results as shown in Table 2.1 and indicate
that effect of financial development depends on the level of human capital. The Hansen and
the difference-in-Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions show that the instruments are
correctly specified. Together with the test of autocorrelation, the diagnostic tests certify
that the estimates are consistent.
Panel B of Table 2.2 computes the marginal effect of financial development on growth
computed at various levels of human capital.4 The results show that the effect of lly on
1Some papers that have used forward orthogonal deviation in the growth context are Brown et al. (2009),
and Kremer et al. (2010).
2Two-step GMM is always more efficient that one-step GMM but has biased asymptotic standard errors.
Windmeijer (2000) provides a finite-sample correction to address this problem.
3The results of one-step GMM are available upon request from the author.
4The partial F-tests reject the null hypotheses that the marginal effects of financial development are the same
at three different levels of human capital as presented in the table.
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Table 2.2: System GMM results
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:
LLY -0.0122*** 0.0484*** -0.0059** 0.0463***
(0.004) (0.013) (0.003) (0.009)
CAP 0.0080*** 0.0065*** 0.0102** 0.0063*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
HC 0.0380*** 0.1615*** 0.0458*** 0.1560***
(0.011) (0.031) (0.008) (0.023)
HC LLY -0.0020*** -0.0019***
(0.000) (0.000)
HC CAP -0.0004*** <-0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
L.LOG rgdpch -1.4873*** -1.2671*** -0.9544*** -1.2713***
(0.182) (0.156) (0.134) (0.110)
Pop. Growth -1.0810*** -0.7698*** -0.8937*** -0.8152***
(0.083) (0.088) (0.077) (0.069)
Govt. Share -0.0070 0.0122 0.0044 0.0025
(0.030) (0.032) (0.019) (0.016)
Investment share 0.0983*** 0.0434*** 0.0760*** 0.0559***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.010)
Inflation 0.0285*** 0.0223*** 0.0277*** 0.0223***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Open 0.0065*** 0.0026 0.0043*** 0.0015
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 10.2849*** 6.7726*** 6.0087*** 6.9007***
(1.730) (1.685) (1.347) (1.137)
Panel B: Implied marginal effect of financial development
at Q25 of hc 0.0296*** 0.0066**
(0.009) (0.003)
at Q50 of hc 0.0141** 0.0035
(0.006) (0.002)
at Q75 of hc -0.0069** -0.0005
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 371 371 371 371
Number of country 88 88 88 88
AR(2) 0.861 0.766 0.948 0.808
Hansen test 0.236 0.221 0.161 0.270
Sargan test 0.418 0.570 0.533 0.789
Difference-in-Hansen 0.105 0.127 0.112 0.263
Number of instruments 58 64 70 80
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All variables are in percentages
Distribution of hc: at Q25=9.56 ; at Q50=17.44; at Q75=28.14
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growth depends on all three levels of hc, as shown by statistically significant estimates. The
effect of cap, however, is statistically significant only at the low level of hc, as shown in
column (3). I find economically significant effects of the interaction variable on growth. As
an illustrative example, the results as shown in column (2) indicate that for a country with
the 25th percentile level of human capital, an economy grows by 5.5% more when finanical
development of the country increases from 25th percentile to 50th percentile. However for a
country with human capital at the 50th percentile, an increase in the growth rate from an
equal change in financial development is only 2.96%. The system GMM results reinforce the
POLS results, and indicates that the improvement in financial development helps countries
with low levels of human capital more than those with high levels. The economics effects
derived from system GMM estimates, however, are lower than those from POLS estimates,
which fits well with other studies that find OLS estimates to be biased upwards.1
Figure 2.3 gives visual illustrations of how the marginal effect of financial development
changes with the level of human capital. In particular, Figure 2.3a shows the marginal effect
of liquid liabilities (lly) and Figure 2.3b depicts the marginal effect of market capitalization
(cap) along the various levels of human capital. Both figures show that the marginal effect
of financial development on growth diminishes as human capital increases. These results
indicate that the marginal effect of financial development is higher in countries with lower
human capital and lower in countries with higher human capital.
I also compute the predicted growth rates implied by the estimates in the third column of
the system GMM results. Here, all the control variables are evaluated at their means. The
measures of human capital and financial development, on the other hand, are considered
at their 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile values. The results presented in Table 2.3, hence,
1For example, Bond (2002).
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: Marginal Effect of Financial Development
show the predicted growth rates of countries at various quantiles of financial development
and human capital, which allows me to see how the growth rates of countries would differ
solely based on their levels of financial development and human capital.
Table 2.3: Predicted growth rates
HC
Q25 Q50 Q75
CAP
Q25 2.35 2.68 3.13
Q50 2.44 2.73 3.12
Q75 2.65 2.83 3.08
The table shows that the predicted five year growth rate of a country with the 25th
percentile human capital and 25th percentile market capitalization is 2.35%, with other
variables held to their respective averages. The growth rate is higher for countries with
both higher levels of human capital and financial development. As can be seen from the
relative changes in magnitude of the predicted growth rates, the table shows that the effect
of financial development is higher for countries with low levels of human capital than for
high levels of human capital. The table also displays that while an increase in the level of
human capital always has a positive effect on growth, an increase in financial development
in countries with high levels of human capital decreases the growth rate, although the effect
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is small. Finally, the table shows that countries that lack financial development can achieve
economic growth through an increase in human capital.
The robustness of the results are tested using difference GMM. The results are similar
to system GMM in that the coefficient estimates of human capital are positive for most
specifications, and the interaction variables are negative and statistically significant across
all specifications. Table 7 in Appendix .1.6 presents these results.
The system GMM for alternate measures of financial development using private credit
(privy) and market value (value) are also used to check robustness of the results. These
results, which are presented in Appendix .1.7, also show that the effect of financial devel-
opment decreases with increasing levels of human capital.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze whether the effect of financial development depends on the level
of human capital of a country in the growth process. I discuss two competing hypotheses on
the role of the interaction of human capital and financial development in achieving growth.
One argues that a country needs high levels of both human capital and financial development
to attain high growth. The other postulates that an increase in human capital can make
up for a lack of financial development, and hence the importance of financial development
decreases with increasing human capital. I test to see which effect dominates.
Using panel data over the 1960-2009 time period and several different estimation tech-
niques, I find that the effect of financial development on growth is lower for countries with
high human capital and vice versa. This finding implies that countries that lack financial
development can achieve greater economic growth through improvements in human capital.
Many countries still have low levels of financial development which impede innovation and
productivity. This study shows that the countries that do not have sound financial devel-
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opment can still attain economic growth through investment in human capital. The result
is both statistically and economically significant, and is robust across various definitions of
financial development and estimation techniques.
Future studies can look at how the interaction of financial development and human
capital would affect more proximate causes of growth, such as innovation or technological
progress. The financial development literature consists of studies that analyze the relation-
ship between financial development and total factor productivity but, to my knowledge,
no studies have directly investigated the relationship between the interaction variable and
the measures of technological progress. Exploring this type of association would allow us
to better understand the channels through which financial development affects economic
growth.
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.1 Appendix A
.1.1 List of countries
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cote d‘ Ivoire
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, South (R)
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Malawi
Malaysia
Moldova, Rep. of
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania, United Rep. of
Thailand
Trinidad &Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Vietnam
Zambia
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.1.2 Data
.1.3 Description and Sources
lly Currency plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of banks
and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. Source: Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)
bank Deposit money bank domestic assets divided by deposit money
bank domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets. Source:
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)
cap Value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchange divided by
GDP. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)
value Value of trades of domestic shares on domestic exchange divided
by GDP. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)
hc % of “higher school completed” of total population. Source: Barro
and Lee (2010)
Real GDP per capita Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series) Source: He-
ston, Summers, and Aten (2011) (Penn World Tables 7.0)
GDP Growth Difference in log GDP per capita at the end of a period and log
GDP per capita at the beginning of a period. Source of Real
GDP per capita: Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011) (Penn World
Tables 6.3)
Initial GDP per capita GDP per capita in 1960. Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten
(2011) (Penn World Tables 7.0)
Inflation Annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator. Source: World
Development Indicators (2011)
Govt. Share Government Share of Real GDP per Capita, current price. Source:
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011) (Penn World Tables 7.0)
Population Growth Percentage change between end of the period and the beginning
of the period. Source: World Development Indicators (2011)
Open Sum of Real exports and imports as share of real GDP. Source:
World Development Indicators (2011)
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.1.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Q25 Q50 Q75 Mean S.D.
LLY 372 30.124 48.336 71.245 55.498 32.819
CAP 372 8.443 23.072 56.080 41.346 47.603
PRIVY 371 21.790 37.254 70.358 49.978 38.981
VALUE 366 0.780 5.155 27.855 27.852 55.692
Table 5: Pairwise Correlations
Growth HC LLY CAP PRIVY VALUE Pop Gr Govt Inv Inf
HC 0.110 1.00
LLY -0.075 0.200 1.00
CAP -0.032 0.264 0.574 1.00
PRIVY -0.115 0.286 0.825 0.61 1.00
VALUE -0.075 0.277 0.457 0.754 0.567 1.00
Pop. Gr. -0.232 -0.468 -0.159 -0.078 -0.231 -0.133 1.00
Govt. 0.046 0.168 -0.005 -0.096 -0.037 -0.037 -0.167 1.00
Inv. 0.179 -0.005 0.267 0.159 0.187 0.089 0.184 -0.098 1.00
Inf. 0.196 0.403 0.334 0.414 0.365 0.317 -0.244 0.039 0.059 1.00
OPEN 0.151 0.236 0.216 0.257 0.194 0.089 -0.047 0.173 0.249 0.315
Govt, Inv and Inf indicate Government share, investment and inflation respectively
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.1.5 Robustness Check (I)
Table 6: POLS Results with privy and value
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:
PRIVY -0.0130*** -0.0020 -0.0132*** -0.0076
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008)
VALUE 0.0026 0.0033* 0.0132** 0.0109**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
HC 0.0102 0.0357* 0.0240* 0.0333
(0.012) (0.021) (0.014) (0.021)
HC PRIVY -0.0005** -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000)
HC VALUE -0.0003** -0.0003*
(0.000) (0.000)
Initial -0.6443*** -0.6756*** -0.6942*** -0.6972***
(0.178) (0.179) (0.181) (0.181)
Pop. Growth -0.7043*** -0.6605*** -0.6897*** -0.6714***
(0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.147)
Govt. Share -0.0409 -0.0351 -0.0428 -0.0394
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Inflation 0.0431*** 0.0420*** 0.0421*** 0.0418***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Open 0.0076*** 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0066***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 4.5742*** 4.3619*** 4.8370*** 4.6637***
(1.657) (1.618) (1.676) (1.648)
Observations 375 375 375 375
R-squared 0.241 0.248 0.250 0.251
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; All variables are in percentages
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.1.6 Robustness Check (II)
Table 7: Difference GMM Results
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:
LLY -0.0047 0.0367*** -0.0012 0.0181***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005)
CAP 0.0050*** 0.0102*** 0.0284*** 0.0147***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
HC -0.0295*** 0.1332*** 0.0201** 0.1296***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011)
HC LLY -0.0010*** -0.0009***
(0.000) (0.000)
HC CAP -0.0005*** -0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000)
L.LOG rgdpch -4.9869*** -8.6654*** -5.4626*** -8.5959***
(0.242) (0.291) (0.222) (0.307)
Pop. Growth -0.6479*** -0.5200*** -0.6742*** -0.5475***
(0.047) (0.031) (0.042) (0.037)
Govt. Share -0.0719*** -0.0204 -0.0441* -0.0469
(0.026) (0.033) (0.025) (0.031)
Investment Share 0.1200*** 0.1170*** 0.1088*** 0.1182***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Inflation 0.0322*** 0.0284*** 0.0294*** 0.0234***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Open 0.0329*** 0.0296*** 0.0273*** 0.0349***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 283 283 283 283
Number of cntry 84 84 84 84
AR(2) 0.465 0.218 0.494 0.181
Hansen test 0.804 0.421 0.992 0.687
Sargan test 0.0558 0.626 0.172 0.574
Number of instruments 86 86 113 95
Note: Estimates obtained using two-step difference GMM with Windmeijer
correction. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All variables are in percentages
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.1.7 Robustness Check (III)
Table 8: System GMM Results with privy and value
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:
PRIVY -0.0146*** -0.0002 -0.0187*** -0.0180***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
VALUE 0.0030** 0.0047*** 0.0202*** 0.0163***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
HC 0.0295*** 0.0744*** 0.0463*** 0.0438***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
HC PRIVY -0.0007*** -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
HC VALUE -0.0005*** -0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000)
L.LOG rgdpch -0.8453*** -0.8593*** -0.8582*** -0.8099***
(0.219) (0.074) (0.152) (0.125)
Pop. Growth -0.8564*** -0.7974*** -0.8565*** -0.8362***
(0.063) (0.031) (0.069) (0.044)
Govt. Share -0.0127 -0.0270 -0.0261 -0.0373**
(0.030) (0.020) (0.028) (0.016)
Investment Share 0.0725*** 0.0767*** 0.0712*** 0.0827***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Inflation 0.0345*** 0.0318*** 0.0310*** 0.0327***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Open 0.0051*** 0.0050*** 0.0054*** 0.0054***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 5.1538*** 4.5931*** 5.5556*** 4.8251***
(1.833) (0.600) (1.306) (1.136)
Observations 372 372 372 372
Number of cntry 88 88 88 88
AR(2) 0.726 0.778 0.675 0.716
Hansen test 0.251 0.372 0.216 0.223
Sargan test 0.189 0.413 0.322 0.454
Difference-in-Hansen 0.121 0.191 0.153 0.189
Number of instruments 63 82 63 80
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All variables are in percentages
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3
Analyzing the Effect of Currency Unions on Financial Development
3.1 Introduction
Events like the ongoing euro zone crisis have increased the importance of understanding
how currency unions affect macroeconomic variables. The currency union literature focuses
on the effect of currency unions on bilateral trade, price co-movements, and shock co-
movements among member nations. The general finding is that currency unions increase
bilateral trade and price co-movements among member nations. There is no conclusive
evidence to support that currency unions lead to higher shock co-movements (Glick and
Rose, 2002; Frankel and Rose, 2002; Barro and Tenreyro, 2007, among others). In this paper,
I analyze the impact of currency unions on a country’s financial development (the quality,
quantity and efficiency of the financial system that is comprised of financial markets, banks
and various other financial intermediaries). Since the empirical finance-growth literature
finds a positive relationship between financial development and economic growth,1 analyzing
the relationship between currency unions and financial development allows me to explore
additional channels through which currency unions affect an economy. To my knowledge,
this relationship has not been studied in the literature.
A variable that is frequently mentioned in the currency union literature is international
financial integration among member countries. International financial integration (ifi) is
1For example, King and Levine (1993); Levine and Zervos (1998); Benhabib and Spiegel (2000); and Rousseau
and Vuthipadadorn (2005). See Levine (2005) for a survey study.
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defined as a state where there are few restrictions on capital transactions. Guiso et al.
(2004) define full integration as “a situation where availability of funds for any user located
within the geographical boundaries [...] is unconstrained by the size of the local (national or
regional) financial markets.” Guiso et al. (2004) and Allen and Song (2005) show a positive
correlation between the formation of a currency union and ifi. Although ifi can potentially
positively affect financial development,1 the effect of ifi on an economy is inconclusive.2 To
this effect, I account for ifi so as to explore direct channels through which currency unions
affect financial development of a country.
In addition, I examine two types of asymmetries in estimating the impact of currency
unions on financial development. First, given that the financial development literature
utilizes several measures of financial development to capture various services provided by
financial systems, I test if currency unions impact these measures differently. Second, I
examine whether currency unions affect financial development of rich and poor countries
differently.
Using data on 152 countries and territories over the 1970-2006 time period, I find that
currency unions negatively affect the size of the overall financial systems but positively affect
the liquidity of stock markets. These relationships between currency unions and financial
development are robust to the inclusion of volume-based and equity-based measures of ifi of
a country. This result suggests that the effect of a currency union goes beyond its effect on
ifi, and that currency unions can affect financial development through channels other than
ifi. Moreover, this paper finds strong asymmetric effects of currency unions on financial
development of high-income and low-income countries. Although the coefficient estimate
on the effect of currency unions on liquid liabilities is statistically insignificant on the full
1as argued by Levine (2002), for example.
2For example, Agenor (2003) and Mishkin (2007) discuss both the costs and benefits of ifi on an economy.
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sample, I find the effect on liquid liabilities to be negative for high-income countries and
positive for low-income countries. In contrast, the results indicate a negative relationship
between currency unions and stock market liquidity for low income countries. The coefficient
estimate for high-income countries, however, is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 discusses currency unions, international
financial integration and financial development, and the predicted relationship between the
variables. This section also discusses channels through which currency unions may affect
a country’s financial development. Section 3.3 presents the econometric specifications and
describes the data utilized in the study. Section 4.5 presents and discusses results. Section
4.6 concludes.
3.2 Background on currency unions, international financial integration, and
financial development
Many studies have analyzed the effect of forming or joining currency unions on various
economic variables. Such studies have been timely given recent developments in inter-
national monetary arrangements. The Euro, which is the most well-known example of a
currency union, is currently used by 17 Western European countries and is commonly used
as a medium of exchange in international trade today. Other countries such as El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Ecuador use the dollar as a legal tender; eight Eastern Caribbean coun-
tries have been using a common currency since 1983; six Central African countries and
eight Western African countries have formed a CFA franc zone and use a common currency.
There are a number of countries considering currency unions. For example, several Eastern
European countries are contemplating unilateral adoption of the Euro as their legal tender;
11 members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are weighing the
possibility of forming a currency union. According to Rose (2006), as of May 5, 2005, 52
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out of 184 International Monetary Fund (IMF) member countries were participating in a
currency unions.
Three economic variables that are frequently analyzed in relation to currency unions are
bilateral trade, price co-movements and output co-movements among member nations. The
general consensus in the literature is that the formation of currency unions increases both
bilateral trade and price co-movement among the member countries. However, the evidence
on the relationship between formation of currency unions and output co-movements is in-
conclusive.1 The currency union literature often discusses ifi among the member nations.
One way currency unions affect ifi is through decreases in exchange rate uncertainties.
Lower exchange rate uncertainties promote capital flows across boundaries, which improves
ifi between countries.
Even though economists generally agree that formation of a currency union leads to
higher ifi, the effect of ifi on an economy is not clear. There are some studies that
contend that ifi positively affects the economy, while others argue otherwise. Agenor (2003),
for example, outlines several benefits of ifi. He argues that ifi increases consumption
smoothing as a country can borrow in recessions and lend in expansions. ifi also increases
domestic investment as households and firms have access to a larger pool of resources that
is not limited to domestic savings. Bekaert et al. (2010) argue that financial liberalization
(integration) improves the quality of institutions and promotes better corporate governance
as foreign investors may require stronger institutions. Bonfiglioli (2008), using both de facto
and de jure measures of ifi, shows that ifi positively affects country-level productivity.
Similarly, Bekaert et al. (2010) show that ifi has both temporary and permanent effects on
economic growth through its effect on factor productivity and capital accumulation.
1 See Rose (2000); Rose and Engel (2002); Frankel and Rose (2002); Barro and Tenreyro (2007).
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The other channel through which ifi affects an economy is by its effect on financial
development.1 Agenor (2003) argues that ifi increases the degree of banking system ef-
ficiency and financial stability, and hence promotes financial development. Bekaert et al.
(2010) point out that higher ifi can spur both equity market efficiency and banking sector
development. Higher ifi translates to increased foreign investments and ownership of as-
sets in a home country which may lead to technological spillovers, increased competition,
and regulatory oversight that positively affect a country’s financial development (Bekaert
et al., 2010). Similarly, Levine (2001) posits that increased competition due to foreign pres-
ence could put downward pressure on profit and overhead expenses, and promote efficiency
through better supervision and regulation in the financial services.
While the aforementioned studies argue that ifi has a positive effect on the economy,
there are others who are skeptical of its effect. For example, Mishkin (2007) argues that ifi
may lead to fiscal imbalances which lead to a currency crisis and ultimately may turn into a
fully fledged financial crisis. Agenor (2003) also mentions some of the costs associated with
ifi. He argues that ifi increases concentration and volatility of capital flows that can lead to
monetary imbalances and domestic misallocation of capital flows. Furthermore, he points
out that the pro-cyclical nature of short term flows can negatively affect macroeconomic
stability. Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) show that ifi has a positive effect only if financial
openness benefits capital allocation and efficiency, and there are no domestic financial crises
or distortions in the international financial market. Similarly, Bonfiglioli (2008) shows that
ifi increases the chance of banking crises in developed countries, although he finds the net
effect of ifi to be positive. Edison et al. (2002) conduct an extensive empirical study that
analyzes the relationship between ifi and economic growth. They fail to find evidence in
1Finanacial development of a country is generally found to be positively correlated with higher economic
growth (King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 2005, etc.).
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favor of the hypothesis that ifi accelerates economic growth, casting some doubts on the
role of ifi in promoting economic growth.
Given the uncertain effects of ifi on an economy, I analyze the direct effects of currency
unions on the financial development of a country. Following the early works of Schumpeter
(1911), numerous researchers have analyzed the relationship between financial development
and growth. Apart from a few notable exceptions (Robinson, 1952; Lucas, 1988), the gen-
eral consensus in the empirical literature is that a positive relationship between financial
development and economic growth exists.1 A significant effect of currency unions on finan-
cial development would imply that currency unions affect an economy through channels
in addition to increasing bilateral trade and price co-movements among member countries.
Analyzing the relationship between currency unions and financial development gives this
study another dimension that has traditionally been overlooked in the literature.
Although currency unions affect ifi, it is not necessarily implied that they also affect
financial development. In addition, some studies show that local financial development is
vital for economic growth even when there are limited frictions to capital movements across
borders. For example, using data on 103 provinces of Italy, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
(2004) demonstrate that local financial development plays an important role even in an
integrated market where, in theory, the geographical boundaries should not matter. They
find that financial development within a province increases the probability that one starts
a business, and increases market entry and competition in the same province. Just as local
financial institutions matter within a country, I argue that the national institutions matter
within an internationally integrated financial system. A valuable policy implication can be
deduced by examining the direct effects of currency unions on financial development rather
1For example, King and Levine (1993); Levine and Zervos (1998); Benhabib and Spiegel (2000); and Rousseau
and Vuthipadadorn (2005). See Levine (2005) for a survey study.
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than on ifi as financial development, unlike ifi, is more certain to have positive effect on
growth.
3.2.1 How does forming (or joining) a currency union affect financial development of a
country?
There are two competing hypotheses on how forming or joining currency unions may
affect the financial development of a country. The objective of this paper is to empirically
test these two competing hypotheses.
Forming or joining a currency union erases a large degree of exchange rate uncertainty.
If an investor wants to invest somewhere outside a country but within the currency union,
he/she does not have to worry about risks that are brought about by exchange rate fluctu-
ations. A domestic market can entice investors from foreign markets with higher rates of
return and not have the investors worry about uncertainties in real rates of return. Reduced
exchange rate frictions that result in capital inflows could potentially promote a country’s
financial development.
It is also possible that the elimination of exchange rate uncertainties create an environ-
ment where the outflow of capital exceeds the inflow, thereby decreasing certain measures
of financial development. With fewer exchange rate uncertainties and more flexibility in
capital flows, funds may flow to countries that have good institutions and better laws that
protect shareholders’ and creditors’ rights. Such an idea is advanced by LaPorta et al.
(1998), who show that countries with better legal systems have more developed financial
systems. Poor countries, on average, have inferior legal systems and hence tend to suffer
from capital outflows which decrease the level of financial development.
While it is a valid argument, a counter argument could be made that countries with
poor legal systems may benefit as they import financial regulations, accounting standards,
44
securities law, bank supervision and corporate governance of their richer currency union
partners (Guiso et al., 2004). Furthermore, the firms in such financial systems may attain
efficiency gains through increased competition as a larger number of firms compete against
each other for funds in both domestic and foreign markets. Guiso et al. (2004) argue that
competitive pressures from intermediaries reduce the cost of providing financial services to
businesses and households, and hence make borrowing more affordable and lending more
efficient.
The next section presents the empirical framework that is used to (1) estimate how
currency unions affect financial development of a country, (2) analyze if currency unions
affect various measures of financial development differently, and (3) examine if currency
unions have asymmetric effect on financial development of high-income and low-income
countries.
3.3 Methodology and Data
3.3.1 Estimating equation
The econometric specification to analyze the effect of currency unions on financial de-
velopment takes the following functional form which is estimated using pooled OLS and
fixed effects methodologies:1
fit = α+ γ CUi,t +ψt + β1(openit) + β2(inflationit) + β3(incomeit) + β4(ifiit) + εit (3.1)
where i and t index country and time respectively. f represents logs of various forms of
financial development that are described in the next subsection. CUi,t is a dummy variable
which, if unity, indicates that the country i has at least one currency union partner in
1A Hausman test is conducted in each instance a fixed effects model is used to ensure the appropriate use of
fixed effects over random effects.
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time t. ψt are the year-specific fixed effects which control for common shocks or trends
across countries. The three other variables that are included in all specifications are the
logs of trade openness (open), inflation (inflation), and real GDP per capita (income).
These variables control for the time variant country-level factors that can potentially affect
a country’s financial development.1
As shown by Guiso et al. (2004) and Allen and Song (2005), currency unions facilitate
ifi among countries. As this paper aims to estimate the direct effect of forming or joining
currency unions on financial development rather than through an indirect channel via change
in ifi, I control for ifi of a country. The log of various forms of international financial
integration (ifi) in the equation captures this effect.
The causal relationship between financial development and income level of a country
given the specification in the paper can potentially pose an endogeneity problem. One solu-
tion to such a problem is to use the initial value of income as opposed to contemporaneous
values as the control variable. This method somewhat deals the endogeneity problems as-
sociated with the estimation, although according to Beck and Levine (2004), it results in
efficiency and information loss. As a robustness check, I use initial income per capita of a
country using the first available income measure of the country (1970 or later). The main
findings of the paper, however, are unaltered with the modified specification.2
3.3.2 Data
The data include annual observations for 152 countries and territories, which are referred
to as “countries” for simplicity. Appendix .1.1 lists the countries in the sample. The
countries are observed for the years between 1970 and 2006.
1For example, as shown by Baltagi et al. (2009); Ang and McKibbin (2007); Calderon and Liu (2003); Boyd
et al. (2001); Kim et al. (2010).
2The results, although not presented in the paper, are available from the author upon request.
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Currency Union data
The data for currency unions are obtained from Rose and Spiegel (2011). In their
paper, Rose and Spiegel treat “common currencies,” “monetary unions” and “currency
unions” alike and hence this paper applies the same definition of currency union. Here, two
countries are in a currency union if “money was interchangeable between the two countries
at a 1:1 par for an extended period of time, so that there was no need to convert prices
when trading between a pair of countries” (Rose and Spiegel, 2011). Out of 152 countries in
the data set, 28 countries have always been a part of a currency union whereas 97 countries
are never a part of any currency unions. The remaining 27 countries are sometimes in and
sometimes out of a currency union.
The data set used in the paper contains many “anchor-client” relationships. “Anchors”
are high-income countries with a sound record of low and stable inflation (for example, the
United States) whose currencies are adopted by relatively lower-income “client” countries
(El Salvador, for example) (Alesina and Barro, 2002). The anchors do not expend much
resources to maintain currency unions they have with clients where clients may unilaterally
adopt a currency of an anchor as a legal tender. Barro and Tenreyro (2007) identify six
countries as anchor countries; they are Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. As a robustness check, I exclude the anchors from the
analysis to verify that the large anchors are not driving the results.1
Further, I conduct a robustness check analysis by dropping the Economic and Monetary
Union of the European Union (EMU) countries from the sample. The EMU is different
than other currency unions in that EMU is the largest currency union, and is comprised
of mostly high-income countries. This method ascertains that results indicate the effect of
1France and Germany are considered as anchors only in the pre-Euro time period in this paper.
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currency unions on a country’s financial development is not masked by EMU’s effect.
Indicators of financial development
I use four different variables as the indicators of financial development. These variables
capture varied services provided by the financial systems.1 Here, the two variables are
used as the main proxies of financial development, and the other two are used to check the
robustness of the results. The first measure, which is referred to as liquid liabilities (lly)
is measured as the ratio of the size of the formal financial intermediary sector (M3) relative
to the GDP of a country. King and Levine (1993) use this measure of “financial depth”
in their seminal paper in the empirical financial development-growth study, and argue that
the size of financial systems is positively related to the services provided.
The second measure of financial development, market liquidity (stliq) is computed as
the value of the trades of domestic shares on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. Levine
and Zervos (1998), among several other studies, use this variable as a measure of financial
development. Levine and Zervos point out that higher market liquidity indicates higher
efficiency and lower transaction costs, which may not be captured by the size of a stock
market.
The two other measures of financial development that are used as robustness checks are
stock market size and private credit. Market capitalization (stcap) captures the size of
the stock market relative to economic activity. This measure is computed as ratio of the
total value of listed domestic shares (capitalization) on domestic exchanges to GDP. Levine
and Zervos (1998) point out that large stock markets may not necessarily be efficient, but
can provide additional services that small markets cannot. Private credit (privy) is the
other measure of financial development and captures the part of mobilized savings that
1For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998a), Boot and Thakor (1997) and Levine (2002).
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is channeled to private firms. This measure excludes credit to the government sector and
credit by the central bank. Private credit measure is computed as a ratio of credit to private
sector by private sector banks to GDP.
The data for all the financial development variables are obtained through Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Levine (2009).
Control variables
The two measures of ifi that are commonly used in the literature are utilized in the
paper.1 The first measure is a volume-based measure of financial openness which is com-
puted as the ratio of the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities to GDP. This measure
is referred to as ifigdp.2 The second measure of ifi that is adopted in this study is an
equity-based measure, which is computed as the ratio of the sum of portfolio and FDI assets
and portfolio and FDI liabilities to GDP. This second measure is referred to as geqgdp.3
The data for these measures of ifi are obtained from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
In addition to ifi variables, I include measures of trade openness (open), inflation
(inflation) and real GDP per capita (income) of a country as control variables. These
variables control for some of the country-specific time-variant effects that can potentially
affect a country’s financial development (Baltagi et al., 2009; Ang and McKibbin, 2007;
Calderon and Liu, 2003; Boyd et al., 2001; Kim et al., 2010).4 The sum of imports and
exports of a country as a share of GDP is used as the measure of openness. Consumer price
index is used as the measure of inflation. The data for trade openness and inflation are
obtained from World Development Indicators (2010). The data for income per capita of
1These measures are used by Edison et al. (2002), Baltagi et al. (2009), Bonfiglioli (2008) etc.
2IFIGDPit = (FAit + FLit)/GDPit
3GEQGDPit = (PEQAit + FDIAit + PEQLit + FDILit)/GDPit
4Baltagi et al. (2009) show the relationship between trade openness and financial development. Similarly,
Calderon and Liu (2003), and Ang and McKibbin (2007), among others, show that a country’s income affects
financial development. Boyd et al. (2001) and Kim et al. (2010) find a correlation between inflation and
financial development.
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countries are obtained from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2011) (Penn World Tables 7.0).
The purpose of this study is not only to test how currency unions affect financial devel-
opment but also to examine whether currency unions affect financial development differently
based on a country’s level of income. To investigate this, I classify countries as high-income
and low-income countries using the median level of income as the threshold value. The
median level of income per capita in the data set is $5,186, which is approximately the
income of Malaysia in 1988.
Table 3.1 reports key summary statistics for all of the variables. The table shows that
countries that are in currency unions tend to have higher level of financial development
than the ones not in a currency union. The difference in stock market measures is especially
noticeable. The countries in currency unions are also richer, tend to be more open, have
lower inflation and are more financially integrated. The ANOVA tests reveal that means
of each of the variables are statistically different for the two income groups.1 Table 6 in
Appendix 4.3 shows pairwise correlations between the variables for all countries. Table 7
provides pairwise correlations between the variables for countries in a currency union, and
Table 8 shows pairwise correlations between the variables for countries that are not in a
currency union.
3.4 Results
To examine the effect of currency unions on the overall financial system, Table 3.2
presents the results with liquid liabilities as a measure of financial development. Here, the
regression specifications include contemporaneous measures of income and volume-based
measure of international financial integration (ifigdp) as control variables, among oth-
ers. The regressions using initial income and equity-based measure of financial integration
1The results are not reported in the paper but are available upon request from the author.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Currency Union Not in Currency Union
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
lly 995 0.49 0.38 2781 0.44 0.33
stliq 308 0.48 0.57 1435 0.15 0.37
stcap 295 0.76 0.56 1336 0.32 0.48
privy 991 0.43 0.35 2752 0.32 0.30
open 995 91.71 68.59 2781 71.64 39.08
inflation 991 6.06 10.13 2754 30.27 311.12
ifigdp 995 3.48 15.60 2781 1.47 4.62
geqgdp 995 1.31 8.86 2717 0.38 1.63
income* 995 11.24 13.65 2781 8.71 9.50
*Income measured in thousands of dollars
(geqgdp), although not presented, yield qualitatively similar results.
I begin by estimating the effect of currency unions on liquid liabilities using pooled OLS
(POLS) estimation. Column (1) of Table 3.2 presents the result of the baseline specification.
Here, all the control variables have statistically significant effect on liquid liabilities. The
results imply that being a member of a currency union is negatively correlated with liquid
liabilities. In column (2), I include the volume-based measure of ifi in the regression. This
measure of ifi is found to have a positive effect on liquid liabilities. Even after controlling
for ifi, the coefficient on the currency union variable remains negative and statistically
significant. This suggests that currency unions affect liquid liabilities through additional
channels than ifi. The POLS results suggest that belonging to a currency union reduces
liquid liabilities by as much as about 11.7%, all other things equal.1
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.2, I use the fixed effects methodology to estimate the
1From column (2), exp(-0.124)-1=-11.7%
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Table 3.2: Currency Unions and Liquid Liabilities (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES POLS POLS FE FE
cu -0.066*** -0.124*** -0.021 -0.045
(0.0208) (0.021) (0.052) (0.055)
inflation 0.132*** 0.166*** -0.051 -0.022
(0.0104) (0.010) (0.036) (0.038)
open 0.096*** -0.009 0.107** 0.096*
(0.017) (0.0183) (0.052) (0.056)
income 0.297*** 0.267*** 0.204* 0.218*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.119) (0.118)
ifi 0.291*** 0.127**
(0.022) (0.061)
Constant 2.319*** 2.611*** 2.680*** 2.610***
(0.080) (0.084) (0.259) (0.263)
Observations 3,917 3,776 3,917 3,776
R-squared 0.451 0.474 0.265 0.265
No. of countries 152 148
Note: Dependent variable: Log of liquid liabilities. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
effect of currency unions on liquid liabilities. The results show that the effect of currency
unions on liquid liabilities, while still negative, is statistically indistinguishable from zero,
with or without the inclusion of ifi. These results suggest that forming or joining a currency
union does not have statistically significant effect on liquid liabilities once the time-invariant
country characteristics are taken into consideration.
Next, I split the sample into high-income and low-income countries to investigate whether
currency unions affect financial development differently based on the level of income.1 Ta-
ble 3.3 presents the fixed effects results which demonstrate a strong asymmetric effect of
currency unions on liquid liabilities. Accounting for the control variables from Table 3.2,
the results display that currency unions reduce liquid liabilities of high-income countries
1I also test whether it matters if the currency union is with a “rich” country, defined as countries in top
income quartile. The fixed effects results indicate that forming currency unions with a richer country does
not exert additional effect on the financial development of a country.
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Table 3.3: Fixed Effects: Currency Unions and Liquid Liabilities (II)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES High-income Low-income
cu -0.122* 0.139*
(0.062) (0.073)
inflation -0.042 0.026
(0.042) (0.071)
open -0.169 0.125*
(0.105) (0.066)
income 0.323** 0.362***
(0.125) (0.118)
ifi 0.114 0.215**
(0.081) (0.107)
Constant 3.666*** 2.141***
(0.487) (0.218)
Observations 1,832 1,944
R-squared 0.317 0.285
No. of countries 87 87
Note: Dependent variable: Log of liquid liabilities. High-income
countries have income of more than $5,186. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
by about 11.5%.1 In contrast, I find that currency unions improve liquid liabilities of low-
income countries by about 14.9%.2 A Chow test on the coefficients of the currency union
variable of the two regressions show that the coefficients are statistically different from one
another for two income groups. The low-income countries perhaps benefit from efficiency
gains where they import better accounting standards and financial regulations that pro-
mote financial development of the countries. The statistical significance (at 10% level) of
the results with the split sample suggest that the statistically insignificant coefficient on the
full-sample estimation may be due to nonlinear effects based on income levels.
For the control variables, Table 3.3 reports that both trade openness and ifi have differ-
ent effect on liquid liabilities based on the income levels of countries. The results show that
trade openness and ifi do not have statistically significant effect on financial development
1exp(-.0122)-1=11.5%
2exp(0.139)-1=14.9%
53
of high-income countries. However, both the variables are positively and statistically signif-
icantly correlated with liquid liabilities of low-income countries. The results, hence, reveal
that trade openness and ifi matter in affecting liquid liabilities of low-income countries, but
not of high-income countries. However, a Chow test on the coefficients fails to show that
coefficients on openness and ifi are statistically different between the two regressions.1
Another form of asymmetry this paper examines is if currency unions have different
effect on various forms of financial development. To this end, I employ a measure of stock
market liquidity which captures stock market efficiency. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present these
results. As with liquid liabilities, I begin by estimating the effect of currency unions on
market liquidity using POLS. Column (1) of Table 3.4 presents the results of the baseline
specification. Unlike for liquid liabilities, the results show that currency union have positive
effect on market liquidity. The results hold when ifi is included in the specification as
shown in column (2). This result supports the finding in Table 3.2 that currency unions
affect financial development through channels other than ifi. Further, the effect of currency
unions is economically large; the results show that currency unions cause as much as about
130.2% increase in market liquidity of a country, all other things equal.2 Using fixed effects
methodology, however, dismisses the statistical significance of the results, as it does when
liquid liabities is used.
Next, using the median level of income to split the sample, I analyze if there exists
an asymmetric effect of currency unions on financial development. Table 3.5 presents the
fixed effects results which again exhibit some asymmetry in the effect of currency unions
on market liquidities. For the control variables, the results show that the effect of ifi on
financial development varies based on the income level of the countries. The coefficient esti-
1Note, however, that the Chow test show that coefficients of the two income groups are jointly statistically
different from one another.
2exp(0.834)-1 = 130.2%
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Table 3.4: Currency Unions and Stock Market Liquidity (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES POLS POLS FE FE
cu 0.864*** 0.834*** 0.150 -0.0276
(0.131) (0.139) (0.258) (0.245)
inflation 0.275*** 0.281*** 0.054 0.101
(0.072) (0.073) (0.134) (0.135)
open -0.524*** -0.468*** -0.089 -0.262
(0.090) (0.105) (0.379) (0.401)
income 0.974*** 1.004*** 1.378*** 1.524***
(0.047) (0.051) (0.488) (0.502)
ifi -0.055 0.778**
(0.122) (0.373)
Constant -0.520 -1.040 -3.616** -3.750**
(0.648) (0.646) (1.503) (1.513)
Observations 1,768 1,743 1,768 1,743
R-squared 0.365 0.374 0.510 0.522
No. of countries 109 106
Note: Dependent variable: Log of stock market liquidities. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
mate on ifi for high-income countries is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient
estimate for low-income countries, on the other hand, although positive, is not statistically
significant. A Chow test, however, reports that these coefficient estimates are not statis-
tically different for two income groups. The results also indicate that while the coefficient
estimate on the currency union variables is not statistically significant for the high-income
countries, it is statistically and economically significant for the low-income countries. The
results show that currency unions reduce market liquidities of a low-income country by as
much as about 70.2%, holding all else constant including ifi.1 Although the Chow test on
the currency union variable coefficients fails to prove that two estimates are statistically
different for the two income groups, the test provides overwhelming evidence to support
that the coefficients are jointly significantly different for two groups.
1exp(-1.212)-1 = -70.2%
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Table 3.5: Fixed Effects: Currency Unions and Stock Market Liquidity (II)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES High Low
cu 0.062 -1.212**
(0.274) (0.508)
inflation 0.023 0.113
(0.177) (0.196)
open 0.289 -0.807
(0.551) (0.657)
income 1.683** 2.532***
(0.820) (0.929)
ifi 1.027** 0.818
(0.480) (0.863)
Constant -7.054** -1.898
(3.012) (2.191)
Observations 1,138 605
R-squared 0.535 0.584
No. of countries 75 46
Note: Dependent variable: Log of stock market liquidities.
High-income countries have income of more than $5,186.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
The robustness of the results is tested using market capitalization and private credit
as the measures of financial development. Tables 9 and 10 in Appendix .1.4 present these
results. The results show that, with POLS estimation, both these measures of financial
development are positively related with the currency union variable even when a measure
of ifi in included in the regression. The fixed effects estimation, however, removes the
statistical significance of the results. Additionally, as a robustness check, Tables 11 and
12 present the results without the “anchor” countries and without the EMU countries
respectively in the regressions.1 The results ascertain that the relationship between currency
unions and financial development is neither driven by large countries that are parts of
currency unions nor by the largest currency union.
1Only the results with liquid liabilities as the dependent variable are presented in the paper.
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3.5 Conclusion
Forming or joining a currency union is thought to have a positive impact on international
financial integration (ifi), but the effect of ifi on an economy is inconclusive. In this
paper, I examine how forming or joining a currency union affects a country’s financial
development. There are competing hypotheses on currency unions might affect a country’s
financial development. Currency unions erase a large degree of exchange rate uncertainty
and make it easier for countries to import better laws and regulations of other currency
unions members. These two factors may improve a country’s financial development. On
the other hand, investors may easily transfer funds to countries with better institutions
and laws that protect shareholders’ and creditors’ rights, which would decrease a country’s
financial development. This paper tests if one hypothesis offsets the other.
This paper also tests for two forms of asymmetries. First, using different measures of
financial development that capture various services provided by the financial system, I exam-
ine if currency unions affect different measures of financial development differently. Second,
I analyze if high-income and low-income countries are impacted differently by currency
unions. As the economic growth literature finds a positive correlation between financial
development and growth, analyzing the relationship between currency unions and finan-
cial development allows me to explore channels other than trade and price co-movements
through which currency unions affect an economy.
Using data on 152 countries and territories over the 1970-2006 time period, I find that
currency unions negatively affect the size of the overall financial systems (liquid liabilities)
but positively affect the liquidity of stock markets. I find these results using pooled OLS.
The results clearly indicate that currency unions affect the two forms of financial develop-
ment differently. These relationships between currency unions and financial development
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are robust to the inclusion of volume-based and equity-based measures of a country’s ifi.
These results suggest that the effect of a currency union goes beyond its effect on ifi. The
results are also robust to the exclusion of “anchor” countries, and the members of Economic
and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU) which certify that the results are not
driven by large currency union members and the largest currency union.
Moreover, this paper finds a strong asymmetry in the effect of currency unions on
financial development of high-income and low-income countries. The coefficient estimate on
belonging to a currency union is statistically insignificant for its effect on liquid liabilities on
the full sample. However, I find the effect on liquid liabilities to be negative and statistically
significant for high-income countries, and positive and statistically significant for low-income
countries. The results suggest that the low-income countries find it easy to import financial
regulations, and other standards and regulations of their richer currency union partners
which, in effect, increases the funds flowing in through various forms such as long-term
deposits. This effect helps improve the financial depth of a country. In contrast, the results
indicate a negative relationship between currency unions and stock market liquidity for
low income countries. The coefficient for high-income countries, however, is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. Since the effect on high-income countries is not statistically
significant, the results suggest that it is not that funds flow from low-income countries to
high-income countries, but perhaps that other forms of financial development improves at
the cost of declining stock market efficiency in the low-income countries.
Barro and Tenreyro (2007) criticize the use of currency union indicator variable as
given as it treats the formation of monetary arrangements as random assignments. The
estimation produces biased coefficient estimates, according to Barro and Tenreyro, because
of the endogeneity problems. I, however, argue that the critique is not valid for this study.
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The currency union literature finds a robust correlation between formation of currency
unions and trade growth. Studies additionally show that currency unions, although reduce
monetary policy flexibility, improve price and business cycle stability if the union is formed
with a country that has stable currency and has similar business cycle patterns (Alesina
and Barro, 2002; Rose and Engel, 2002, among others). It is easy to conceive that currency
unions are primarily formed for these reasons, but not to boost financial development.
Nonetheless, an avenue for future research would be to identify exogenous components of
currency union, as Barro and Tenreyro advocate, and use them as instruments to examine
how a currency union affects a country’s financial development.
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.1 Appendix B
.1.1 List of countries
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Central African Rep.
Chad
Colombia
Congo,Dem. Rep.
Congo, Republic
Costa Rica
Croatia
Czech Republic
Côte d’Ivoire
Denmark
Dominica
Dominican Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia, The
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lesotho
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Samoa
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St.Vincent & Gren.
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
(152)
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.1.2 Description and Sources
lly Currency plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of banks and
other financial intermediaries dividend by GDP. Source: Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)
stliq Value of trades of domestic shares on domestic exchange divided
by GDP.Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)
stcap Value of listed domestic shares on domestic exchange divided by
GDP. Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)
privy Credit to private sector by private sector banks divided by GDP.
Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2009)
ifigdp Sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities divided by GDP.
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
geqgdp Sum of portfolio equity assets and liabilities, and foreign direct
investment assets liabilities divided by GDP. Source: Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
income Real GDP per capita: PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain
Series), at 2005 constant prices. Measure in thousand if US $’s.
Source: Heston et al. (2011)
cu Rose and Spiegel (2011)
inflation Consumer price index (2005 = 100). Source: World Development
Indicators (2011)
open Sum of real exports and imports as share of real GDP. Source:
World Development Indicators (2011)
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.1.3 Pairwise Correlations
Table 6: Pairwise Correlation for all countries
lly stliq stcap privy open inflation ifigdp geqgdp
stval 0.367 1
stcap 0.620 0.740 1
privy 0.783 0.538 0.632 1
open 0.365 0.182 0.477 0.260 1
inflation -0.064 -0.037 -0.054 -0.056 -0.027 1
ifigdp 0.491 0.033 0.247 0.212 0.296 -0.007 1
geqgdp 0.457 0.025 0.227 0.187 0.261 -0.008 0.968 1
income 0.597 0.490 0.550 0.666 0.224 -0.036 0.343 0.316
Table 7: Pairwise Correlation for Countries in Currency Unions
lly stliq stcap privy open inflation ifigdp geqgdp
stval 0.070 1
stcap 0.430 0.658 1
privy 0.776 0.300 0.402 1
open 0.433 -0.027 0.462 0.336 1
inflation -0.200 -0.148 -0.135 -0.214 -0.069 1
ifigdp 0.630 -0.122 0.196 0.235 0.298 -0.035 1
geqgdp 0.623 -0.112 0.198 0.217 0.267 -0.033 0.982 1
income 0.624 0.381 0.466 0.651 0.224 -0.109 0.416 0.392
Table 8: Pairwise Correlation for Countries not in Currency Unions
lly stliq stcap privy open inflation ifigdp geqgdp
stval 0.421 1
stcap 0.639 0.742 1
privy 0.790 0.556 0.635 1
open 0.331 0.238 0.459 0.185 1
inflation -0.071 -0.031 -0.048 -0.059 -0.028 1
ifigdp 0.462 0.123 0.305 0.219 0.295 -0.005 1.000
geqgdp 0.488 0.165 0.370 0.243 0.329 -0.013 0.972 1
income 0.587 0.456 0.506 0.675 0.208 -0.041 0.277 0.294
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.1.4 Robustness Checks
Table 9: Currency Unions and Stock Market Capitalization (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES POLS POLS FE FE
cu 0.678*** 0.539*** 0.063 -0.027
(0.062) (0.068) (0.145) (0.141)
inflation 0.154*** 0.164*** 0.229* 0.230**
(0.054) (0.050) (0.118) (0.102)
open 0.224*** -0.007 0.091 0.108
(0.049) (0.058) (0.288) (0.278)
income 0.449*** 0.359*** 1.507*** 1.584***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.456) (0.467)
ifi 0.476*** 0.394*
(0.059) (0.217)
Constant -0.102 0.619** -1.882* -2.319**
(0.274) (0.293) (0.996) (0.951)
Observations 1,695 1,674 1,695 1,674
R-squared 0.401 0.423 0.566 0.576
No. of countries 111 109
Note: Dependent variable: Stock market capitalization. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
63
Table 10: Currency Unions and Private Credit (I)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES POLS POLS FE FE
cu 0.178*** 0.131*** 0.136* 0.103
(0.024) (0.026) (0.077) (0.075)
inflation 0.143*** 0.162*** -0.085** -0.046
(0.012) (0.013) (0.043) (0.046)
open 0.087*** 0.020 0.214** 0.177
(0.019) (0.023) (0.107) (0.114)
income 0.482*** 0.462*** 0.416** 0.441**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.207) (0.205)
ifi 0.204*** 0.244***
(0.029) (0.089)
Constant 1.596*** 1.772*** 1.511*** 1.469***
(0.101) (0.112) (0.525) (0.532)
Observations 4,039 3,876 4,039 3,876
R-squared 0.534 0.536 0.231 0.239
No. of countries 154 150
Note: Dependent variable: Private credit. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
64
Table 11: Currency Unions and Liquid Liabilities (III): Without anchor countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES POLS POLS FE FE
cu -0.073*** -0.125*** -0.029 -0.055
(0.023) (0.023) (0.054) (0.057)
inflation 0.112*** 0.144*** -0.056 -0.025
(0.011) (0.010) (0.037) (0.039)
open 0.169*** 0.0659*** 0.117** 0.106*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.052) (0.056)
income 0.275*** 0.247*** 0.203* 0.217*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.120) (0.118)
ifi 0.277*** 0.131**
(0.022) (0.062)
Constant 2.085*** 2.377*** 2.617*** 2.548***
(0.084) (0.0879) (0.256) (0.261)
Observations 3,752 3,611 3,752 3,611
R-squared 0.438 0.456 0.264 0.264
No. of countries 148 144
Note: Dependent variable: Private credit. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Anchor countries: Australia,
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States.
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Table 12: Currency Unions and Liquid Liabilities (IV): Without EMU countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES POLS POLS FE FE
cu -0.087*** -0.136*** 0.006 -0.001
(0.022) (0.022) (0.059) (0.0628)
inflation 0.136*** 0.168*** -0.054 -0.024
(0.011) (0.010) (0.037) (0.039)
open 0.099*** -0.005 0.109** 0.096*
(0.017) (0.018) (0.052) (0.056)
income 0.292*** 0.264*** 0.201* 0.218*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.120) (0.119)
ifi 0.291*** 0.146**
(0.022) (0.068)
Constant 2.317*** 2.602*** 2.662*** 2.583***
(0.080) (0.0846) (0.258) (0.261)
Observations 3,836 3,695 3,836 3,695
R-squared 0.439 0.460 0.259 0.260
Number of cc 152 148
Note: Dependent variable: Private credit. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4
Financial Development, External Dependence and the Margins of Trade: A
Firm-level Analysis
4.1 Introduction
A country’s financial development is widely acknowledged to be an important determi-
nant of international trade patterns. Several augmentations of the standard trade models
include services provided by financial systems which are found to be critical in affecting
exports. For example, in the extensions of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade framework, financial
development is shown be a source of comparative advantage in industries that depend more
on external finance (Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987).1 Similarly, in the “New New trade theory”
framework, financial development is demonstrated to explain the variance of trade in the
presence of liquidity constraints (Melitz, 2003; Chaney, 2005). A number of empirical stud-
ies have followed to analyze the role of financial development in affecting trade flows. These
studies generally ascertain the positive role of financial development on exports (Beck, 2002;
Berman and Héricourt, 2010, among others).
As firms face trade barriers in their exporting activities such as fixed sunk-costs and
variable trade costs, firm-level exports studies have focused on firm’s financial constraints to
explain exports (Chaney, 2005; Berman and Héricourt, 2010; Greenaway et al., 2007, among
others). A firm must meet fixed sunk-costs in order to export to a foreign market and hence
1Rajan and Zingales (1998a) define external dependence as “the difference between investments and cash
generated from operations.”
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fixed costs affect the decision to export. Variable costs, on the other hand, constrain how
much a firm exports. Given the presence to two different types of costs associated with
exports, the trade literature increasingly divides firm’s export decisions into the extensive
margin (the probability of exporting) and the intensive margin (the volume of exports) of
trade. I examine if financial development facilitates firms to cover their fixed and variable
costs proportionately with the provision of funds given their dependence on external finance.
Put differently, I analyze if a country’s financial development has heterogeneous effect on
the two margins of trade.
In their influential paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998a) estimate the overall industry-level
dependence on external finance. Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales argue that young and
mature firms have different level of dependence on external finance as most firms rely on
initial public offerings for funds early in their lives. As this trend is consistent in different
industries, Rajan and Zingales further devise an age-based measure of dependence on ex-
ternal finance for young and mature firms in different industries.1 Utilizing the alternate
measure of external dependence, I examine whether financial development affects exports
of young and mature firms differently.2 Incorporating such a differentiated measure allows
me to consider an additional source of firm heterogeneity that has not been studied in the
literature.
Financial development implies deepening and/or widening of credit markets. A deepen-
ing of credit market is where a firm has an easier access to additional credit, and widening
credit market is where more firms have increased access to external finance. A deep and
a wide credit market would positively affect firms’ both extensive and intensive margins of
1Rajan and Zingales (1998a) classify young firms as those that are listed for less than 10 years.
2Studies such as Beck (2002) and Berman and Héricourt (2010) that use Rajan and Zingales’ (1998a) measure
of external dependence do not exploit that fact that Rajan and Zingales provide separate measures of external
dependence for young and mature firms.
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trade as financially constrained firms find it easier to finance their fixed and variable trade
costs (Chaney, 2005). While deepening and widening of credit markets enhance exports,
financial development can disproportionately benefit certain firms if financial development
only deepens the credit market. A deep but narrow financial system implies that certain
firms have easy access to additional credit, whereas others find it difficult to finance their
costs. I examine if firm age is the defining characteristics of firms based on which financial
development has the heterogeneous effect on different firms.
This paper utilizes firm-level data of approximately 43,500 firms from 80 countries that
vary significantly in their income levels for the 2002-2009 time period. Using an instru-
mental variable approach, I find that the overall industry-level measure of dependence on
external finance negatively influences both the export market participation and the volume
of exports. The results also show that a country’s financial development negatively affects
the export market participation and positively affects the volume of exports. Further, I find
that financial development disproportionately benefits firms with higher level of external
dependence. For both margins of trade, the results indicate that financial development
helps firms with higher levels of external dependence more than the ones with lower levels
in their exporting activities. Finally, while I find that young and mature firms are affected
differently by financial development on their export participations, such asymmetry is not
shown by the results on the volume of exports. These findings assert that examining the
impact of financial development using the overall industry-level measure of external depen-
dence may mask an important asymmetric effect of financial development on young and
mature firms’ margins of trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the related
literature. Section 4.3 discusses the data utilized in the study. Section 4.4 presents the
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econometric methodologies and discusses the potential endogeneity problem in estimating
exports with financial development. Section 4.5 presents and discusses results. Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Background Literature
The studies in the finance-trade nexus largely follow two strands of literature. One
views financial development as a source of comparative advantage, which makes engaging
in exports profitable to firms. A theoretical model developed by Kletzer and Bardhan
(1987) falls into this category. Kletzer and Bardhan show that countries with fewer credit
market frictions have comparative advantage in industries and sectors that rely more on
external finance. Countries with high credit market frictions, on the other hand, specialize
in industries and sectors that do not require as much external finance. Beck (2002) builds
on this model and shows that countries with high levels of financial development have
comparative advantage in sectors with high scale economies. Beck shows that the firms
in a well-developed financial system can better utilize financial services to exploit scale
economies, and hence the country becomes the net exporter of goods that exhibit increasing
returns to scale in production. While this paper by Beck is a cross-country study, he confirms
his findings with a follow-up cross-industry study. Using the industry measure of external
dependence as formulated by Rajan and Zingales (1998a), Beck (2003) demonstrates that
countries with high levels of financial development have larger export shares in industries
that show higher dependence on external finance.
In contrast to the literature that supports the notion that financial development of a
country provides comparative advantage to firms, the second strand in the literature comes
from the “New New Trade Theory” which explains trade through within-sector productivity
differences between firms (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004). Melitz (2003) shows that
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only productive firms export to foreign markets due to the presence of trade costs. The
less-productive ones are unable to meet trade costs which prevent them from exporting.
Helpman et al. (2004) corroborate the idea of within-sector firm heterogeneity and show
that only the most efficient ones serve foreign markets.
Chaney (2005) augments Melitz’s model with financial constraints as the source of firm
heterogeneity. Chaney argues that financially constrained firms are less likely to cover
fixed costs, and hence are less likely to be exporters. A host of studies have followed
to empirically test Chaney’s theoretical predictions in the context of the “New New Trade
Theory” framework. Many of these studies support his claim. For example, Greenaway et al.
(2007), using a panel of 9292 UK manufacturing firms from 1993-2003, demonstrate that
start-up costs are important factors in determining firms’ export status, since new exporters
tend to have lower liquidity and higher leverage than continuous exporters. In the presence
of such start-up costs, Manova (2008), using data on 91 countries from 1980-1997, shows
that credit constraints play an important role in international trade. She exhibits that, in
the presence of credit constraints, equity market liberalization produces a more pronounced
impact on the sectors that are more dependent on external finance. Similarly, Berman and
Héricourt (2010) underline the importance of firms’ access to finance in their exporting
behaviors. They study firms’ export status (the extensive margin of trade) and the amount
exported by firms (the intensive margin of trade) using data on about 5000 firms from nine
developing and emerging economies. They find that firms’ access to finance affects their
initial entry decision, but not subsequent participation decisions. This finding lends support
to the start-up cost hypothesis that the cost of remaining in the market is much lower after
incurring the initial fixed cost, which generates what Berman and Héricourt refer to as
“export hysteresis.” Berman and Héricourt also show that the exporting firms are more
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productive and hence export larger quantities in more financially developed countries, thus
affecting the volume of exports.
While improvements in financial health of firms and financial development of countries
are shown to have positive effect on trade flows, Amiti and Weinstein (2011), motivated
by the recent global financial crisis, analyze if deteriorations in financial development have
negatively affected international trade. Using a data set that covers Japanese financial crises
from 1990 to 2010, Amiti and Weinstein find a strong relationship between the negative
shocks in bank health and decline in exports of Japanese firms. This finding highlights the
importance of country-level financial development in determining trade flows.
While many studies, including the aforementioned ones, show that financial development
positively affects both margins of trade, these findings are not uncontested. For example,
Greenaway et al. (2007) underplay the role of finance in affecting trade. They show that
exporters are better off financially than the non-exporters, but the difference occurs ex post
as an outcome of exporting, not before the decision is made. Similarly, after accounting for
observed and unobserved firm characteristics, Stiebale (2011) fails to find evidence in favor
of the claim that financial constraints matter for exporting behaviors.
Even with some inconclusive findings, two broad conclusions can be drawn from the ex-
tant literature about the relationship between finance and trade. First, financial constraints
faced by firms decrease their ability to export. Firms that depend more on external finance,
as a result, export less, whether that is measured on the extensive or intensive margin
(i.e., they are less likely to export, and export less when they do, compared to less con-
strained firms). Second, country-level financial development and the availability of external
finance facilitate firms’ participations in export markets and the volume of trade. Both the
comparative advantage and the sunk cost strands of the literature reach such conclusions.
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This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, in addition to
the widely-studied heterogeneity in productivity across firms, I investigate whether the re-
lationship between financial development and exports varies based on the age of the firm.
Many studies use Rajan and Zingales’ (1998a) measure of overall industry-level dependence
on external finance as financial constraints.1 Rajan and Zingales, however, also estimate the
measure of external dependence based on the age of firms as the authors believe that firms
in their early lives are more dependent on external finance than in the subsequent periods.
Although several studies use the overall industry-level measure of dependence on external
finance, they do not utilize the age-based measure of external dependence. I adopt this as-
pect of heterogeneity among firms, and analyze if country-level financial development affects
young and mature firms differently. Second, I employ an instrumental variable approach in
the estimation of the role of financial development in influencing exports. Financial devel-
opment and exports may be simultaneously determined as argued by Beck (2002). Failure
to account for simultaneity between variables may lead to biased estimates. The use of in-
strumental variable estimation, which can potentially correct the endogeneity problem, has
not been emphasized in the firm-level analysis in the financial development-trade literature.
These extensions are discussed in more detail in the following sections.
4.3 Data
This paper employs data of approximately 43,500 firms from 80 countries for the 2002-
2009 time period. The firm-level data are obtained from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys
(WBES) database.2 The data is in a cross-section form, and the countries in the sample
whose firms are examined are observed at different points in time between 2002-2009. Some
1 For example, Beck (2003), Berman and Héricourt (2010) etc.
2The following link provides a detailed description of the sample design of the WBES:
www.enterprisesurveys.org
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firms may have been surveyed more than once if a country appears on the data set in multiple
points in time, but I cannot identify such firms as a unique identifier is not available for
the data set utilized. While the firm-level data provided by the WBES includes a sample
of firms in manufacturing and service sectors that is representative of the entire private
economy, I consider only the firms in manufacturing sector. I do so because the measure
of external dependence derived from Rajan and Zingales (1998a) is only available for firms
in the manufacturing sector. About 25% of the firms in the data used in this paper are
exporters.
Appendix .1.1 provides descriptions and sources of data for all the variables employed
in the study. Table 5 in Appendix .1.2 presents a list of countries in the sample.1 As
shown in the table, the data include sample firms from countries that vary widely in their
incomes. For example, real GDP per capita ranges from $220 (Democratic Republic of
Congo in 2006) to $37,032 (Ireland in 2005). The dependent variables are whether or not
a firm exports (the extensive margin) and the exports as a percentage of total sales (the
intensive margin). Firms’ decisions to export measure the extensive margin of trade, and
the fraction of revenue from exports measures the intensive margin of trade. I test how
an industry’s dependence on external finance and country-level financial development affect
the two margins of trade controlling for other firm characteristics widely believed to affect
exports at the firm level. The control variables are described next.
Firm characteristics
The data includes several measures of firm characteristics such as firm size, firm age, and
foreign ownership. These variables are used as the control variables to account for various
firm characteristics that are believed to affect a firm’s exporting behaviors.2
1The table also presents a country’s average real GDP and the average level of financial development in the
sample.
2See Wagner (2010) for detailed analysis of firm characteristics and exports.
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Larger firms supposedly have comparative advantages due to scale economies (because
of the presence of fixed costs in exporting), benefits from management specialization and are
less credit constrained than smaller firms (Guiso et al., 2004; Wagner, 2010). The empirical
evidences support this view.1 In this study, I use the number of full-time workers to measure
firm size (size). The firms are classified into small, medium, and large, as defined by the
WBES database, where small firms have fewer than 20 full-time workers, 20-100 full-time
workers for medium firms, and large firms consists of more than 100 full-time workers.
The ownership variable (ownership) shows the percentage of shares of domestic firms
held by foreign owners. Firms with higher share of foreign ownership are likely to export
more than firms with higher share of domestic ownership (Manova et al., 2011). The owners
of the former types are more accustomed to foreign markets, and have easier access to foreign
financial markets which could make exporting more profitable.
Firm age (firmage) captures the experience of firms in the market, and can be inter-
preted as a sign of learning of skills and knowledge that are specific to a foreign market, if
firms are exporters. Although seemingly firm age would have a positive effect on exporting
behavior, Wagner (1996) fails to find any significant correlation between the variables. Be-
sides being a control variable, firm age allows me to categorize firms into young and mature
firms, where young firms are of less than 10 years.2
Tables 6, 7 and 8 in Appendix .1.3 present the descriptive statistics of the firm level
data. As can be seen from the tables, firms that export tend to be larger (based on number
of full time workers), older and have higher share of foreign ownership compared to their
non-exporting counterparts.
External Dependence
1For example, Wagner (1996) for the extensive margin of trade, and Wagner (2006) for the intensive margin
of trade
2Rajan and Zingales (1998a) define young firms as those that have been listed for less than ten years.
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Rajan and Zingales (1998a) argue that some industries depend more on external finance
than others because of “technical differences,” such as differences in initial investment and
continual investment required, and the timing of expenses outlay and revenue inflow. Rajan
and Zingales further point out that these technological differences between industries carry
over across countries to a large extent, which imply that dependence on external finance of
one industry is similar in all countries. With this assumption, Rajan and Zingales use data
on Unites States manufacturing firms to compute a firm’s dependence on external finance,
which is defined as the difference between capital expenditures and cash flow from operations
divided by capital expenditures.1,2 After computing external dependence of several firms,
an industry median is used to obtain an industry-level measure of external dependence.
Rajan and Zingales choose the dependence of U.S. firms because the capital market in the
U.S. is relatively frictionless, and hence a desired amount of external funds can be raised by
firms. The measure of external dependence of firms in a particular industry is represented
by rz.
As an example, the median external dependence in the data based on Rajan and Zin-
gales’ computation is for the metals and machinery industry. The metals and machinery
industry has rz of .345, which implies the industry must finance 34.5% of the aggregate
capital expenditure. The rest is internally generated through cash inflows. While most
industries rely on external sources to finance part of their capital expenditure, industries
such as the leather industry generate enough capital inflows to more than cover their cap-
ital expenditures. Specifically, rz of the leather industry is -0.14, which implies that its
generated capital flow is 14% higher than its capital expenditure outlay.
1To be precise, Rajan and Zingales (1998a) sum a firm’s use of external finance over the 1980’s and then
divide by the sum of capital expenditures in the 1980’s to obtain a firm’s dependence on external finance.
2Rajan and Zingales (1998a) use only publicly traded firms in their computation of external dependence. I,
however, have private firms in my data set as well.
76
Furthermore, Rajan and Zingales (1998a) observe that firms in their early life are more
dependent on external finance as they raise substantial capital through equity financing.
After approximately ten years, the firm’s net equity decreases to zero and hovers around
zero. Hence, using ten years since first listed as a cut off value, Rajan and Zingales estimate
the external dependence of young and mature firms. This age-based external dependence
of firms is denoted by rzage.
To illustrate, the Chemicals and Pharmaceutical industry, as shown in Table 9 in Ap-
pendix .1.4, has an overall industry-level external dependence (rz) of 1.49. However, the
external dependence (rzage here) of young firms is 2.06, while it is 0.03 for mature firms.
In general, younger firms tend to rely more on external finance as shown in the table. The
classification of firms as young and mature is important for this study as I test if financial
development affects the exporting behavior of young and mature firms differently.
Financial Development
A high level of financial development is believed to relieve financial constraints faced by
firms, and help meet fixed start-up costs and variable trade costs required of firms, enabling
them to export to foreign markets and increase the volume of export (Beck, 2002; Manova
et al., 2011, for example). I use private credit, which is defined as credit to the private
sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP, as the indicator of financial development.
Private credit captures a part of mobilized savings that is channeled to private firms. The
funds to the private sector can be utilized to cover fixed or variable costs that are required
for exports. This measure excludes credit to the government sector and by the central
bank. Several studies in the finance-trade literature such as Beck (2002) and Berman and
Héricourt (2010), among others, use private credit as a measure of financial development.
Private credit is denoted by fd
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The data on private credit are obtained through Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
(2009). Table 5 in Appendix .1.2 presents data on private credit for countries along with
the average real GDP per capita (income) and the measures of property rights index
(pri).1 Real GDP per capita, a country-level measure, is included to account for country-
level determinants of exports. A country’s income can potentially affect if and how much a
firm in the country exports. The next sub-section discusses the property rights index.
Instrumental Variables
Endogeneity between the dependent variables (the extensive and the intensive margins of
trade) and private credit can potentially arise from two sources. First, one of the dependent
variables and private credit may be simultaneously determined. I discuss how financial
development may affect exports in Section 4.2. At the same time, exports may affect a
country’s financial development. Financial development here can be demand-driven in a
sense that exporting firms or the firms that want to export may demand more services from
the financial sector to ease their liquidity constraints. This leads to a state where countries
with higher export share have more advanced financial systems (Beck, 2002). Second, some
omitted variables may be correlated with both financial development and the measures of
exports. For example, the investment climate or the business environment of a country may
be correlated with both the exports variables and private credit. As the use of endogenous
regressors may lead to biased estimates, I approach the problem by using an instrumental
variable strategy which can potentially correct the endogeneity problem in estimation of
firms’ export behaviors.
I use property rights index to instrument for financial development in estimating the
effect on exports. The index is computed based on various aspects of the protection of
1Real GDP per capita is measured in thousands of dollars.
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property rights; they include a country’s legal protection of private property, enforcement of
laws to protect property rights by the government and the probability that the government
will expropriate private property. The index ranges from 1 to 5 where better protections
receive a higher score. The property rights index is obtained from LaPorta et al. (1999).
Several other predetermined variables have been used as instruments for the endogenous
measures of financial development. The use of a country’s legal origin to instrument finan-
cial development is fairly common.1 For this study, however, property rights index serves
as a better instrument than legal origin in the exports regression. An efficient instrumen-
tal variable estimator utilizes an instrument that has high variation with the endogenous
variable (Murray, 2005; Wooldridge, 2009). Table 10 in Appendix .1.5 shows that property
rights index has a much higher correlation with private credit (fd) than legal origin, a com-
monly used variable to instrument financial development.2 common in the table denotes
a dummy variable that indicates common law as the legal origin. Second, property rights
index is predetermined (at least) in the model as the index is computed for the periods
before 1997 (Holmes et al., 1997), and my sample begins in 2002. These two reasons make
property rights index a relevant instrument. The validity of the instrument, of course, is
tested in several ways which are described in the next section.
4.4 Empirical Methodology
4.4.1 The extensive margin of trade
I estimate the following probit specification to examine how a country’s financial de-
velopment affects a firm’s probability of being an exporter given the financial constraints a
1For example, Levine et al. (2000). These studies are influenced by LaPorta et al. (1998) who demonstrate
that legal origin has a significant effect on the financial development of the country through its influence on
protection of creditors and shareholders rights, and accounting standards, etc.
2Note also that the correlation between property rights index and export variables is higher than the corre-
lation between legal origin and export variables.
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firm faces and a host of other firm characteristics:
Prob(Xijkt > 0) =
1 if
ψt + β1sizeit + β2ownershipit + β3firmageit
+β4incomekt + αrzjt + γfdkt + Θfdkt × rzjt + εijkt > 0
0 otherwise
(4.1)
where i, j, k and t index firm, industry, country and time respectively. Xijkt denotes exports
as a fraction of total sales. Hence, Prob(Xijkt > 0) indicates the probability that firm i in
industry j, country k and time t is an exporter. ψt is the year-specific fixed effects which
account for the common shocks or trend across countries. size, ownership and firmage
are the firm-level determinants of exports, as discussed in Section 4.3. rz denotes the
industry-level external dependence of firms and income denotes real GDP per capita. fd
represents financial development of a country which is proxied by private credit. Real GDP
per capita and financial development are the proxies for all the country-level determinants of
exports.1 Finally, fd×rz denotes the interaction term of external dependence and financial
development which allows me to analyze if financial development relieves constraints on
firms given their dependence on external finance. The coefficients in the probit model are
estimated using maximum likelihood estimation.
Given Rajan and Zingales’ (1998a) age-based measure of external finance, I replace rz
with rzage in an another specification. I further split the age-based measure of external
dependence into rzage young and rzage mature which allows me to examine if external
dependence affects young and mature firms differently. In addition, in order to analyze if
financial development affects young and mature firms differently, I divide the interaction
of financial development and age-based measure of external dependence (fd× rzage) into
1The country fixed effects, when included in the regression, drops because of the collinearity between the
country-level determinants of exports and country fixed effects. As such, country fixed effects are not
included in the regressions.
80
fd×rzage young and fd×rzage mature. Estimating the coefficients on these variables
separately allows me to test their joint significance and the equality of coefficients to examine
the asymmetric effect of financial development on young and mature firms.
4.4.2 The intensive margin of trade
I use pooled OLS to examine how financial development affects the volume of exports
if the firms trade, given the financial constraints firms face and other firm characteristics.
The pooled OLS specification takes the following form:
Xijkt = β0 + ψt + β1sizeit + β2ownershipit + β3firmageit + β4incomekt
+ αrzjt + γfdkt + Θfdkt × rzjt + εijkt , if Xijkt > 0. (4.2)
As for the intensive margin of trade, I replace rz with rzage given the age-based mea-
sure of external dependence. I further split rzage into rzage young and rzage mature,
and fd× rzage into fd× rzage young and fd× rzage mature. This strategy provides
testable hypotheses on the joint significance of young and mature firms’ variables, and the
equality of the coefficients.
A potential endogeneity concern arises if equations (4.1) and (4.2) are estimated with
probit and pooled OLS models respectively. The presence of endogeneity may lead to
biased estimates of the parameters. For this reason, I estimate the two equations using the
instrumental variable approach. Here, private credit is potentially endogenous in both the
models. Private credit enters the specification independently and through its interaction
with the measure of external dependence. Hence, I use the property rights index, and
the interaction of property rights index and external dependence as instruments. Amemiya
(1974) shows that the interaction term of two exogenous regressors can be used to instrument
an interaction term with one exogenous and one endogenous variable to obtain consistent
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estimates.
Several tests are in order to attest the proper use of instruments. For the probit models,
in order to certify that the instruments used are exogenous, the error term of each speci-
fication is regressed on the instruments used. The error terms must be uncorrelated with
the instruments for the instruments to be valid which denotes exogeneity of instruments.
For the pooled OLS model, three tests are carried out to ensure the proper use of
instruments. The first one is an underidentification test which tests the null hypothesis
that the excluded instruments are not correlated with the endogenous regressors. A model
that is identified rejects the null hypothesis. Kleibergen and Paap’s (2006) heteroskedastic-
robust version of the LM test is used as the underidentification test.
The second test is the weak identification test in which the null hypothesis is that the
coefficients of instruments used have a magnitude of zero in the first-stage auxiliary regres-
sion of two stage least square (2SLS) regression (Murray, 2005). Put differently, the null
assumes that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors but
only weakly. A well-specified model that uses proper instruments rejects the null hypothe-
sis. The F-test version of the Cragg and Donald (1993) Wald statistic is used in the paper,
and the critical values are obtained from Stock and Yogo (2005).
Finally, the third test is the overidentification test which is used if the model is not
exactly identified. This test checks the joint null hypotheses that the the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the specification. The use of
valid instruments fails to reject the null hypothesis. The Hansen J test for overidentification
is used in this paper.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 The extensive margin of trade
The extensive margin of trade results are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The reported
coefficients are the marginal effects computed at means of the control variables, and median
levels of private credit (.32) and external dependence (.345). These tables report how
financial development affects a firm’s probability of being an exporter given its dependence
on external finance. Private credit is used as a measure of financial development. The
measure, however, is instrumented with property rights index to address endogeneity in the
export regressions. Exogeneity tests of the instruments show that the instruments used are
correctly specified.
I start with the overall industry-level measure of external dependence (rz). Because
of the potential simultaneity between a country’s real GDP per capita and the exports
variables, the baseline specification excludes the measure of income. Column (1) presents
the result of the baseline specification. Column (2) presents the results with real GDP per
capita included in the specification. Both results point to the same general conclusions.
For the control variables, the results indicate that larger firms, firms with higher foreign
ownership and more experienced firms have higher probabilities of being exporters. Column
(2) indicates that firms in a richer country have higher probabilities of being exporters.1
With the inclusion of the interaction term of measures of financial development and external
dependence (fd×rz), the effect of financial development depends on the measure of external
dependence. As a simulation of results, I consider the metals and machinery industry whose
external dependence (of .345) represents the median level in the sample. For a firm in this
industry, the results show that an advancement in private credit from the 25th percentile
1With income included in the specification, the magnitude on fd decreases sharply, potentially because of
the collinearity between a country’s income and a country’s financial development.
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Table 4.1: Financial development and Extensive margin of trade using overall industry-level
measure
VARIABLES (1) (2)
rz -0.450*** -0.449***
(.044) (.030)
fd 0.010 -1.037***
-0.065 (.059)
fd× rz 1.190*** 1.195***
(.119) (.082)
Medium size 0.075*** 0.076***
(.002) (.002)
Large size 0.105*** 0.103***
(.002) (.003)
ownership 0.002*** 0.001***
(.000) (.000)
firmage 0.001*** 0.001***
(.000) (.000)
Real GDP/capita 0.022***
(.002)
Observations 43,510 43,510
psuedo R2 0.188 0.192
Chi2 8088 8292
Dependent variables: Probability that a firm is an exporters. Marginal effects
computed at means of the control variables, and median on rz and fd. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Instruments:
pri & pri×rz. Firm size omitted category: small sized firms. Real GDP
per capita measured in thousands of dollars. Exogeneity of instruments are
checked by regressing the error term of each specification on the instruments
used. The instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms indicating validity
of the instruments.
(value of .18) to the 50th percentile level (value of .32) reduces the probability of being
an exporter by as much as 7.6%, ceteris paribus.1 Additionally, for a firm in the same
industry, further progress of private credit from the 50th percentile to the 75th percentile
level (value of .58) reduces the extensive margin by an additional 1.8%, ceteris paribus.
These results suggest that, for a median level of external dependence, improvement in
1For the sample as a whole, the 25th percentile of private credit is .18, the median in 0.32, and the 75th
percentile is .58. For easier comparisons, the same values are used everywhere else in simulations.
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financial development hurts a firm’s probability of being an exporter.
The results also point out that while an improvement in financial development reduces
the probability of being an exporter given the median level of external dependence on firms,
financial development disproportionately helps firms with higher levels of external depen-
dence. As an illustration, for a firm in an industry at the 25th percentile level of external
dependence (the food industry with the external dependence of .14), an increase in financial
development from the 25th percentile to the 50th percentile reduces the probability of being
an exporter by as much as 13.5%, ceteris paribus. Comparing to 7.6% reduction in probabil-
ity of being an exporter of a firm with a higher level of external dependence (the metal and
machinery industry, as shown above), the result suggests that financial development hurts
firms with lesser external dependence more than firms with higher external dependence.
Next, I examine whether financial development affects young and mature firms differ-
ently as their dependence on external finance are different as shown by Rajan and Zingales
(1998a). Here, instead of using the overall industry-level measure of external dependence
(rz), I use the age-based measure of external dependence (rzage). Table 4.2 presents the
marginal effects evaluated at the means of control variables and the median level of finan-
cial development. In addition, in column (1), rzage is evaluated at young firms’ external
dependence in the metals and machinery (.81). In column (2), mature firms’ external de-
pendence in the same industry is considered (.31).1 First, the table demonstrates similar
results for the control variables as in Table 4.1. Second, both columns (1) and (2) show
that improvement in a country’s financial development is shown to have negative effect on
the probability of being an exporter. These results show that financial development has a
negative effect on the probability of being an exporter using both the young and mature
1As noted before, the metals and machinery industry has the median level of overall industry-level external
finance.
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Table 4.2: Financial development and Extensive margin of trade using age-based measure
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
rzage 0.048* 0.046*
(.028) (.026)
rzage young 0.188***
(.053)
rzage mature -0.134
(.037)
fd -0.722*** -0.701*** -0.587***
(.062) (.060) (.143)
fd× rzage -0.204*** -0.198***
(.071) (.066)
fd× rzage young -0.593***
(.143)
fd× rzage mature 0.222***
(.081)
Medium size 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.096***
(.003) (.002) (.003)
Large size 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.133***
(.002) (.001) (.003)
ownership 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(.000) (.000) (.000)
firmage 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(.000) (.000) (.000)
Real GDP/Capita 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.028***
(.002) (.002) (.002)
Observations 43,510 43,510 43,510
psuedo R2 0.188 0.188 0.192
Chi2 8088 8088 8292
Dependent variables: Probability that the firms are exporters. Marginal effects com-
puted at means of the control variables, rzage evaluated at .81 and .31 in columns
(1) and (2) respectively. rzage young evaluated at .81 and rzage mature at .31
in column (3). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1 Instruments for column (1): pri & pri×rz. Instruments for column (3):
pri, pri×rzage young & pri×rzage mature. Firm size omitted category: small
sized firms. Real GDP per capita measured in thousands of dollars. Exogeneity of
instruments are checked by regressing the error term of each specification on the in-
struments used. The instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms indicating
validity of the instruments.
firm’s level of external dependence.
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Third, in order to test if the effect of financial development is significantly different
for young and mature firms, column (3) of Table 4.2 presents the results with separate
estimates for young and mature firms. Here, the interaction term is further split into the
interaction term for young firms (fd× rzage young) and the interaction term for mature
firms (fd×rzage mature). Similarly, the coefficient on the age-based measure of external
dependence is estimated for young and mature firms (rzage young and rzage mature)
separately. This method allows me to test the asymmetric effect of financial development on
young and mature firms’ exports and provides testable hypotheses on their joint significance
and the equality of the coefficients. For a firm in the metals and machinery industry (at
the median level of overall external dependence), the results reveal that an advancement
in private credit from the 25th percentile to the 50th percentile (the value of .18 to .32)
reduces the probability of being an exporter by 14.1% for young firms. Mature firms, on
the other hand, are affected by only 7.1% for the same amount of change in private credit.1,2
The joint significance tests of the coefficients on both rzage young and rzage mature,
and fd × rzage young and fd × rzage mature show that inclusion of the variables are
valid.3 Similarly, I test to see if the coefficient estimates are significantly different for young
and mature firms. The results present that external dependence constraints young and
mature firms differently in their export participations.4 Similarly, the results indicate that
a country’s financial development affects young and mature firms differently given their
external dependence.5
The results of the extensive margin of trade hence indicate that the dependence on ex-
1The same values of private credit are chosen to make comparisions easier.
2As private credit increases to .32 from .58, the probability of being an exporter decreases by 16.4% for young
firms, and by 14.6% for matuure firms.
3χ2 statistics of 20.13 and 21.26 respectively.
4χ2=19.98
5χ2=21.03.
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ternal finance significantly affects firms’ export participations, and the negative effect varies
for young and mature firms. Similarly, financial development is found to have a negative
effect on firms’ probabilities of being exporters, and this effect too varies based on the age of
a firm. Although, overall, financial development hurts firms’ export participations, the re-
sults indicate that financial development disproportionately affects firms with different level
of external dependence. I find that financial development hurts firms with higher level of
financial development to a lesser extent than firms with lower level of external dependence.
Moreover, evaluated at the median level of external dependence, young firms are shown to
be hurt more by the advancement in financial development in their export participation
than the mature ones. These findings contend that analyzing the effect on export partic-
ipation by examining the overall industry-level measure of external dependence masks an
important asymmetry in the effect of financial development; given the dependence on ex-
ternal finance, a country’s financial development affects young and mature firms differently
in their probabilities of being exporters.
4.5.2 The intensive margin of trade
The intensive margin of trade results are presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. These tables
show how financial development affects the volume of exports of firms, if they export,
given their dependence on external finance. As before, private credit is used as a measure
of financial development. I, however, instrument the measure with property rights index
to address endogeneity in the export regressions. The tests of the under, weak and over-
identification of the model in both the tables confirm that the instruments used are correctly
specified.1
1The instrument fails the weak exogeneity test in column (2) of Table 4.2. This implies that excluded
instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors. The underidentification and overi-
dentification tests, however, are fine.
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Table 4.3: Financial development and Intensive margin of trade of all firms
VARIABLES (1) (2)
rz -86.692*** -72.116***
(11.663) (14.905)
fd -126.875*** 27.976
(17.866) (30.159)
fd× rz 158.767*** 123.492***
(26.407) (33.408)
Medium size 1.359** 0.243
(0.679) (0.695)
Large size 3.940*** 2.749***
(0.453) (0.509)
ownership 0.148*** 0.126***
(0.010) (0.010)
firmage -0.273*** -0.273***
(0.024) (0.023)
Real GDP/capita -3.263***
(0.658)
Constant 88.314*** 87.842***
(6.573) (6.653)
Observations 10,824 10,824
F-stat 95.00 98.79
rk LM stat 60.05 42.52
rk F stat 28.74 22.35
Excluded Instruments 2 2
Dependent variables: Volume of exports if the firms export. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Instruments: pri &
pri×rz. Firm size omitted category: small sized firms. Real GDP per capita
measured in thousands of dollars.
Table 4.3 shows the results based on the overall industry-level measure of external
dependence (rz). As before, the baseline specification in column (1) excludes real GDP per
capita. The results indicate that larger firm size and higher foreign ownership share lead
firms to export more (as a fraction of their revenues) as predicted. While higher firm age
improves the probability of being an exporter as shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the results
show, perhaps surprisingly, that older firms generate a lower fraction of their sales from
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exports than younger firms. More importantly for this study, the results show that higher
dependence on external finance decreases the share of revenue from exports. However,
having a higher level of financial development allays the constraints placed by dependence
on external finance, and allows firms to export higher fraction of their revenues. Column
(2) of Table 4.3 includes real GDP per capita in the regression equation. The main results
remain qualitatively similar to the ones in column (1), although the coefficient estimate on
real GDP per capita is negative.
To be specific, for a firm in the metals and machinery industry (the industry with
the median level of external dependence), the results indicate that an improvement in
private credit from the 25th percentile (value of .18) to the 50th percentile level (value of
.32) improves the volume of exports by as much as 10.3%, ceteris paribus. The intensive
margin further improves by 19.1% as private credit increases to the 75th percentile (value
of .58). These results hence show that an advancement in financial development promotes
the intensive margin of trade given the financial constraints faced by firms.
In order to examine if financial development affects the volume of exports differently
for firms with different levels of external dependence, I consider firms in industries with the
25th percentile and the 75th percentile levels of external dependence. The food industry has
the 25th percentile level of external dependence with the value of .14 and the electronics
and other manufacturing industry has the 75th percentile level of external dependence with
the value of .74. The results show that, for the food industry, an improvement in private
credit from the 25th percentile level to the 50th percentile level yields in increase in a firm’s
volume of exports by 6.3%. For the same level of change in private credit, a firm in the
electronics and other manufacturing industry sees an improvement in the volume of exports
by 12%. The results, hence, indicate that financial development disproportionately helps
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firms with a higher level of external dependence than the ones with a lower level. These
results are comparable to the general findings of the intensive margin of trade.
I continue by analyzing firms’ classifications as young and mature firms and use the age-
based external dependence (rzage) accordingly. Table 4.4 presents these results. First,
in column (1), I use the age-based measure of external dependence (rzage), and the in-
teraction of financial development and rzage (fd × rzage). The results here indicate
that young firms and mature firms are affected differently as they have different external
dependence measures. For instance, for firms with a median level of external dependence
(the metals and machinery industry), the results indicate that an increase in private credit
from the 25th percentile to the 50th percentile leads young firms to improve their volume of
exports by 14.8%. For the same amount of change in private credit, mature firms, on the
other hand, only improve their volume of exports by 9.8%. The results indicate that given
the measure of external dependence, financial development affects young firms more than
their mature counterparts.
Upon further investigation, however, the results indicate that the effect of financial
development on the volume of export is not significantly different for young and mature
firms. In the second column (2), I divide the effect of rzage and fd× rzage into the the
effect on young and mature firms (rzage young and rzage mature, and fd×rzage young
and fd× rzage mature). Conducting several tests on the coefficients, the results indicate
that the coefficients estimates on rzage young and rzage mature, and fd×rzage young
and fd×rzage mature are individually and jointly significant.1 However, the results show
that the coefficients on rzage young and rzage mature are not statistically different from
one another, and neither are the coefficients on fd×rzage young and fd×rzage mature.2
1χ2 statistics of 49.51 and 37.5 respectively for the joint significance test.
2χ2 statistics of .87 and 1.1 respectively for the test of equality of coefficients
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Table 4.4: Financial development and Intensive margin of trade of Mature and Young firms
VARIABLES (1) (2)
rzage -38.028***
(6.546)
fd 47.224** 29.746
(18.448) (33.695)
fd× rzage 72.417***
(14.308)
rzage young -61.334**
(30.812)
rzage mature -29.392***
(6.042)
fd× rzage young 131.222*
(72.238)
fd× rzage mature 45.356***
(13.844)
Medium size 1.078* 1.243*
(0.634) (0.719)
Large size 3.681*** 3.853***
(0.460) (0.552)
ownership 0.124*** 0.132***
(0.010) (0.015)
firmage -0.396*** -0.390***
(0.023) (0.028)
Real. GDP/capita -2.443*** -2.087**
(0.580) (0.871)
Constant 65.136*** 68.137***
(3.455) (5.671)
Observations 10,120 10,120
F-stat 94.69 79.78
rk LM stat 47.92 4.776
rk F stat 26.05 1.542
excluded Instruments 2 3
Dependent variables: Volume of exports if the firms export. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Instruments for column (1): pri &
pri×fd. Instruments for column (2): pri, pri×rzage young & pri×rzage mature.
Firm size omitted category: small sized firms. Real GDP per capita measured in
thousands of dollars.
These results indicate a lack of asymmetry on the effect of external dependence and financial
development on the intensive margin of trade based on the age of firms.
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The results for the intensive margin of trade suggest that while the dependence on
external finance negatively affects the volume of exports, the negative effect is reversed
with a country’s financial development which mitigates some of the constraints of exporting.
Evaluated at the median level of external dependence, I find that a higher level of a country’s
financial development is associated with higher volume of exports. As with the extensive
margin of trade, I find that a country’s financial development disproportionately benefits
firms with higher level of external dependence. Unlike the results for the extensive margin
of trade, I find that a country’s financial development does not affect young and mature
firms differently on their volume of exports.
4.6 Conclusion
Firms face fixed sunk-costs and variable trade costs in their exporting activities. These
costs can be a binding constraint which may affect a firm’s decision to export (the extensive
margin of trade) and how much a firm exports (the intensive margin of trade). The finance-
trade literature emphasizes the role of financial constraints faced by firms in hindering
the export behaviors (Melitz, 2003; Chaney, 2005, among others). Given the financial
constraints, a country’s financial development is shown to positively influence exports (Beck,
2002; Berman and Héricourt, 2010, among others).
This paper empirically investigates the effect of financial development on the probability
of being an exporter (the extensive margin of trade) and the volume of exports (the intensive
margin of trade) given the industry-level dependence on external finance of firms. Moreover,
it builds on the existing literature in several ways. First, I investigate whether financial
development affects young and mature firms differently as they differ on their dependence
on external finance as pointed out by (Rajan and Zingales, 1998a). Second, to account
for endogeneity in exports regressions, I use the instrumental variable approach in the
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estimation of role of financial development in influencing exports. This estimation approach
has not been emphasized in the empirical firm-level financial development-trade literature.
Using firm-level data of approximately 43,500 firms from 80 countries for the 2002-
2009 time period, I find that dependence on external finance of firms negatively affects
both the export market participation and the volume of exports. The results also show
that a country’s financial development negatively affects the extensive margin of trade and
positively affects the intensive margin of trade evaluated at the median level of external
dependence. Furthermore, this study finds that financial development disproportionately
affects firms with higher level of external dependence. For both margins of trade, I find
that financial development facilitates firms with higher levels of external dependence more
that the ones with lower levels. Finally, I find that young and mature firms are affected
differently by financial development on their export participations. However, the results do
not support such asymmetry for the extensive margin of trade. These findings hence contend
that examining the effect of financial development using the overall industry-level measure
of external dependence may mask an important asymmetric effect of financial development
on young and mature firms.
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.1 Appendix C
.1.1 Description and Sources
Firm level:
Exports value Exports as a fraction of total sales. Source: World Bank Enter-
prise Surveys (WBES)
Exporter
dummy
Dummy variable that takes a value of unity if firm exports.
Source: WBES
size size=1 (small) if the number of full time workers (ftwkr) is
less than 20. size=2 (medium) if ftwkr is between 20 and 100.
size=3 (large) if ftwkr are greater than 100. Source: WBES
firmage Age of a firm. Source: WBES
ownership The percentage of shares of domestic firms held by foreign owners.
Source: WBES
Industry level:
rz External dependence of all firms in an industry. Source: Rajan
and Zingales (1998a)
rzage External dependence of firms depending on whether they are ma-
ture or young firms. Young firms have age of less than 10 years.
Source: Rajan and Zingales (1998a)
Country level:
fd Private credit by domestic money banks Source: Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Levine (2009)
pri Property rights index (on a scale from 1 to 5). Measures the
degree to which the government protects and enforces laws that
protect private property. Source: LaPorta et al. (1999)
income Real GDP per capita (measured in thousands of US $’s). Source:
Heston et al. (2011)
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.1.2 Country level data
Table 5: Country level
Country PRI FD Income Obs.
Albania 3 0.164 5.151 308
Algeria 3 0.119 6.063 424
Angola 2 0.055 3.673 283
Argentina 4 0.109 10.655 767
Armenia 3 0.110 4.618 429
Bangladesh 2 0.344 1.290 1340
Benin 3 0.191 1.116 55
Bolivia 3 0.341 3.535 453
Botswana 4 0.193 9.660 174
Brazil 3 0.412 8.502 2984
Bulgaria 3 0.481 9.805 1597
Burkina Faso 3 0.155 0.902 189
Burundi 2 0.195 0.374 151
Cambodia 2 0.140 1.801 220
Cameroon 2 0.088 1.810 246
Cape Verde 4 0.475 3.536 125
Chad 2 0.027 1.276 63
Chile 5 0.619 11.645 724
Colombia 3 0.309 7.068 728
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 0.022 0.220 201
Costa Rica 3 0.315 9.949 338
Croatia 2 0.637 14.958 574
Czech Republic 4 0.421 20.898 285
Cte d’Ivoire 2 0.170 1.343 208
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3 0.423 4.758 2186
El Salvador 3 0.413 6.239 499
Estonia 4 0.874 15.454 227
Ethiopia 2 0.181 0.551 365
Fiji 3 0.565 4.284 42
Gabon 3 0.258 10.280 37
Gambia, The 4 0.135 1.163 79
Georgia 2 0.238 4.615 273
Germany 5 1.109 31.611 468
Greece 4 0.715 25.724 164
Guatemala 3 0.290 5.809 372
Honduras 3 0.395 3.444 312
Hungary 4 0.512 16.326 539
Indonesia 3 0.230 4.075 1156
Ireland 5 1.421 37.032 222
Jordan 4 0.835 4.378 387
Kenya 3 0.224 1.234 449
Korea, Rep. 5 0.894 22.808 287
Lao PDR 1 0.063 2.633 156
Latvia 4 0.828 12.135 188
Lesotho 3 0.112 1.311 94
Lithuania 3 0.390 12.628 444
Madagascar 3 0.099 0.753 229
Malawi 3 0.089 0.653 80
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – Continued from previous page
Country PRI FD Income Obs.
Malaysia 4 1.007 11.643 1075
Mali 3 0.160 0.937 301
Mexico 3 0.148 12.418 1117
Moldova 3 0.273 2.214 488
Mongolia 3 0.592 3.167 184
Morocco 4 0.609 3.328 146
Mozambique 2 0.128 0.716 346
Nepal 3 0.686 1.211 128
Niger 3 0.087 0.535 93
Nigeria 3 0.173 1.940 1133
Pakistan 4 0.271 2.292 772
Panama 3 0.767 8.357 422
Paraguay 3 0.160 3.620 466
Peru 3 0.172 6.231 380
Philippines 4 0.209 2.839 971
Poland 4 0.321 13.737 853
Portugal 4 1.403 20.097 191
Romania 2 0.277 8.618 676
Russian Federation 3 0.380 13.505 1111
Senegal 4 0.208 1.495 262
Sierra Leone 2 0.055 0.873 78
Slovak 3 0.418 18.073 193
Slovenia 3 0.700 23.352 275
South 3 0.754 7.673 694
Spain 4 1.301 27.984 238
Swaziland 4 0.205 3.380 135
Tanzania 3 0.096 0.984 298
Turkey 4 0.222 9.836 2533
Uganda 4 0.059 1.028 355
Uruguay 4 0.225 9.278 435
Vietnam 1 1.097 2.872 829
Zambia 3 0.101 1.794 308
Mean 3.15 0.383 7.447
St. dev. 0.858 0.331 7.890
Count 39607
97
.1.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 6: All Firms
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full-time workers 39022 110.773 275.303 0 7000
ownership 39606 11.859 32.331 0 100
firmage 39606 18.398 15.806 1 172
Export value 39606 12.275 27.592 0 100
Table 7: Exporters
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full-time workers 10528 244.289 424.267 1 7000
ownership 10824 24.704 43.131 0 100
firmage 10824 21.919 18.566 1 172
Export value 10824 44.914 36.329 0.25 100
Table 8: Non-exporters
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Full-time workers 28494 61.442 168.145 0 5359
ownership 28782 7.0287 25.563 0 100
firmage 28782 17.074 14.413 1 151
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.1.4 Industry Dependence
Table 9: RZ numbers
Industry RZ dependence
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals
All 1.49
Young 2.06
Mature 0.03
Non-metalic and plastic
All 1.14
Young 1.14
Mature ..
Other manufacturing+classified All 0.47
+electronics Young 0.8
Mature -0.05
Metals and Machinery
All 0.345
Young 0.81
Mature 0.31
Textiles
RZ all 0.40
Young 0.66
Mature 0.14
Auto and auto components
All 0.39
Young 0.76
Mature 0.11
Wood and furniture
All 0.24
Young 0.68
Mature 0.33
Food
All 0.14
Young 0.66
Mature -0.05
Garments
All 0.03
Young 0.27
Mature -0.02
Leather
All -0.14
Young -1.53
Mature -1.33
Young: less than 10 years
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.1.5 Pairwise correlation
Table 10: Pairwise Correlation with Property Rights Index
pri common expdum expvalue
common 0.019 1
Exporter dummy 0.094 -0.037 1
Export value 0.018 0.014 0.073 1
fd 0.174 0.056 0.105 0.091
common: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if common law as legal origin.
expdum: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 of if the firm exported. expvalue:
Total exports as a share to total sales.
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